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"Beautiful she had never been, but she had looked kind and 
happy; now she had fallen off so that you might well believe 
she was ten years older than her husband, and not only 
three. Most folk deemed she took the loss of her children 
harder than most wives - she lived in great plenty and in 
high esteem, and things were well between her and her 
husband, so far as people could see; Lavrans did not go to 
other women, he took counsel with her in all affairs, and, 
sober or drunk, he never said a harsh word to her. Besides 
she was not so old but she might yet bear many children, if 
it were God's pleasure."
From Kristin Lavransdatter by Sigrid Undset.
ABSTRACT.
Economic theories of fertility are tested on Norwegian bime 
series data for the period 19 62-1991. The Easterlin hypothesis 
receives the most attention, and generally little evidence is 
found to support this hypothesis. Large relative cohort size 
ratios, however, seem to support the Easterlin hypothesis more 
than small ones. A New Home Economics model with a special 
emphasis on male income and female wages is also estimated, and 
results are obtained favoring this model. Finally, the problem 
with effective time lags in economic fertility models is tested, 
and in general an effective time lag of two years is favored.
Since women's liberation is social liberation, the New Home 
Economics model predicts a rather dark picture of future 
fertility. Based on the empirical results, increased equality 
between the sexes will have the unevitable side effect of reduced 
fertility.
21.0 INTRODUCTION.
Since before the days of Thomas Robert Malthus and David 
Ricardo, demography and economics have been closely 
interconnected. In particular, investigations to reveal the 
interaction or causality between population growth and growth of 
the economy have received great attention. The question of which 
came first, the chicken or the egg, is a better known example of 
a similar causality problem.
The fertility revolution and the demographic transition are 
notions of interest to a variety of different academics, even 
though they are demographic concepts. The interest is so 
dispersed that psychologists, sociologists, economists, 
anthropologists and geographers, among others, are researching 
the demographic transition. This makes demography one of the most 
interdisciplinary research fields, and thus one of the most 
interesting and controversial.
The population debate has become a distinct subfield in 
economics, and several models have been developed to explain 
among other things fertility trends. In this paper I will examine 
two of the most prominent economic fertility models on Norwegian 
time series data from 1962-1991. First, I will examine the 
Easterlin Hypothesis. This is a model that incorporates economic 
as well as social aspects of fertility behavior, however, 
Easterlin is a Professor in Economics and the Easterlin 
Hypothesis is considered an economic model of fertility. Second,
3I will examine the New Home Economics (or Chicago School) 
approach as represented by Butz and Ward (1980). Their model is 
based on economic microfoundations, and only economic variables 
are considered. Finally, I will present a discussion on 
instruments that are expected to influence fertility as well as 
other population features. This is the policy section, and 
pronatalist policies are central. Most importantly, I will 
examine the possible effect pronatalist policy may have in 
Norway. However, before I start to dig into the essence of this 
paper, I feel that a historical review is appropriate.
Today, population growth in most less developed countries is 
extremely high, whereas the situation in developed countries is 
diametrically opposite, with stagnating or decreasing population. 
For this reason, the determinants of population growth are quite 
different among nations and across socio-economic levels. Most 
populations are at or near their natural marital or biological 
fertility before the onset of the so called fertility transition. 
The natural marital fertility level before the fertility 
transition displays large variations across populations, but is 
often considered to be determined by: The Postpartum infecundable 
period, the Waiting Time to Conception, Intrauterine Mortality, 
Permanent Sterility, Frequency of Intercourse and 
breastfeeding. 1
In countries where the fertility transition has been 
completed, family limitation practices exist. These family 
limitation practices can be divided into two groups: direct and
4indirect family limitation. Direct family limitation are 
deliberate actions undertaken by married couples to reduce the 
number of child births, e.g., use of contraception, induced 
abortion and sexual abstinence. Indirect family limitation on the 
other hand is a sort of human behavior, which has the secondary 
effect of reduced chilbearing. Indirect family limitation 
includes prolonged education, inventions or increased 
opportunities for other goods than children that may raise 
children's relative cost, increased participation in the labor 
force and delayed marriage. In most highly industrialized 
countries today, indirect family limitations are becoming 
increasingly more important as a determinant of child birth.
1.1 Economic Consequences of Population Features.
Another important aspect is the economic consequence of both 
increased and reduced population. The consequences of an 
increased population are obvious. First, when the population 
increases, more funds have to be locked in as investment capital 
if capital per person is to remain constant2. Second, in 
scarcely populated areas, increased population may result in a 
more efficient way to exploit natural resources. Third, a fast 
growth rate of the population tends to increase unemployment. 
Finally, it is often assumed that technological progress is 
dependent upon the rate of population growth.
More recently, geographers and economists have also been
5emphasizing the damaging effect a population boom might have on 
the environment. Most economists seem to agree that there are 
more disadvantages than advantages with an increasing population, 
or at least a booming population. A relevant question would 
therefore be: Is the economy better served with a reduced 
population? The answer to this question is not an easy one. A 
decrease in population will increase the amount of natural 
resources per person, without investments in capital. However, 
the problem is that the reduced labor force will probably not be 
able to handle all the capital, e.g., factories, apartments or 
houses, kindergartens and schoolhouses. The prosperity of rural 
areas will also become vulnerable as population declines, because 
the economic foundations may collapse. Schools, post offices and 
other institutions will become increasingly more expensive to 
run, because there will be too few customers to cover the fixed 
costs. With an increased circle of customers, the average cost 
for these kinds of services will decrease. In economic 
terminology this is called economies of scale. Thus, a decline in 
population can eliminate economies of scale in production and 
services. In response to this declining profitability of capital 
in depopulated areas, these institutions may reorganize.
Finally, as is the case in developed countries where both 
mortality and fertility are low, there will be an aging of the 
population. This aging of the population will give the working 
population, which will have decreased relatively to the non 
working population, a greater economic burden because they must
6support the non working population as well as themselves. An 
income tax is the way money is primarily being transferred to the 
non-working population in Norway. The demand for different 
consumption and public goods will also change with fluctuations 
in age structure. In demography, the economic burden of the 
working population is measured by the total dependency ratio, 
which is a ratio of economically active to economically inactive 
people in a population. But often, because of lack of data or 
severe difficulties in defining economic activity in many 
countries, a ratio of age groups is used instead. Working age in 
developed countries is often defined as all people between the 
ages of 16 or 18 and 64, and the people outside this age range 
are considered either to be children or elderly. In Norway this 
dependency ratio is approximately 0.53, or 53 out of 1003.
This brief, but nevertheless important review of the 
relevance of variations in population size and its composition to 
economics, tells a story without clear answers. As explained by 
economic theories, it seems that both a declining and an 
increasing population can have adverse effects on the economy. 
Therefore, on theoretical grounds, it is justifiable to examine 
the population size and its composition.
1.2 The Demographic Equation.
(1) DependencyRa ti o +El derly 1(:100
Worki ngAges
7There are four components that determine the basic 
demographic equation, or the population growth.
(2) GrowthRate=
MYP=Mid-year population. 
B=Births.
D=Deaths.
INM=Inmigration. 
OUT=Outmigration.
_ pt+i~pt B D y INM OUT
MYP MYP MYP MYP MYP
The difference between the birth rate and the death rate is often 
called natural increases, whereas the difference between the 
inmigration rate and outmigration rate is called net migration . 4  
In order to predict the population growth for a particular 
population, one needs to find actual or estimated values for the 
respective variables. A major advantage that allows for 
simplification in some small developed countries with a 
moderately strict immigration policy is that changes in the 
fertility rate constitute almost all the population growth. This 
is true in Norway, a country with approximately 4.3 million 
inhabitants. First, the immigration and emigration rates have 
been relatively stable since the abrupt decrease in the 
emigration to the U.S. caused by U.S. immigration quotas.
8Emigration from Norway to the U.S. started in about 1825, peaked 
in the 1890s, and ceased before World War II. During this period 
one million Norwegians emigrated to the U.S. If one considers the 
population in Norway during the same period, which ranged from 1 
million in 1825 to 3,1 million in 1946 it is easy to realize the 
enormous impact this emigration had on the Norwegian population 
and age structure. In fact, more than 40 percent of the natural 
increase during the period 1840 and 1914 emigrated to the U.S . 5  
The age structure was distorted enormously, because the emigrants 
were chiefly young resourceful men.
It has been argued that the emigration to the U.S. was 
caused by both push and a pull factors. It was a push phenomenon, 
because the rapid growth of the Norwegian population could not 
provide adequate living conditions for people in the uncultivable 
regions of Norway. This resulted in farm subdivisions and 
individual loss of land at a time when Norway's industrial growth 
was insufficient to absorb the increased population, especially 
in urban areas. The emigration also reflected a pull phenomenon, 
primarily because "The New World" had not yet been settled, and 
vast land areas were available to immigrants. The U.S. Homestead 
Acts of 1862 and 1872, seemed to be of particular importance 
because of the opportunities the Acts offered to poor 
Norwegians . 6  It has also been argued, with truth I believe, that 
many more people from Norway would have migrated to the U.S. and 
Canada if it were not for many intervening obstacles. These 
obstacles included: financial burdens, physical hardships
9associated with long sea journeys and uncertainty about 
opportunities in the U.S. and Canada.
In the period following World War II, Norway experienced 
more stability, with both periods of negative net migration and 
positive net migration. Since the early 1980s, Norway has become 
a country that attracts foreigners because of its stable 
political situation and for being one of the richest countries in 
the world. The net migration to Norway during this period has 
been relatively stable, averaging four thousand people yearly.
Most of the immigrants to Norway are from other developed 
neighboring countries, such as Sweden and Denmark. This seems 
natural, because those two countries have a lot in common with 
Norway, e.g., history, culture and most important, highly similar 
languages. Even though Swedes and Danes make up one-third of the 
total immigration to Norway, their net immigration share is just 
10 percent, because of Norwegian countermigration. The countries 
that constitute the larger share of the positive net immigration 
to Norway are traditionally poor countries ravaged by wars and 
political and religious disorder in Asia and Africa. More 
recently the former Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R and her 
independent republics have become increasingly dominant migration 
forces in Europe. This is chiefly because of ethnic conflicts and 
wars of independence.
Most of the immigrating people are relatively young, with 
both hopes and prospects for work. It is interesting that Norway 
has experienced a positive net inmigration from the U.S. since
1980, but with a large share of people fifty years and older 
(approximately 35 percent). The only other countries with such a 
large share of older people are Sweden and Denmark with 30 
percent. The reasons for this are neither easy to address nor 
within the scope of this paper.
The trend in mortality is often measured in life expectancy 
at birth . 7  This measure is also among one of the most commonly 
used welfare indicators along with infant mortality rates. Low 
mortality may be used as a general indicator of the level of 
welfare: Since it gives more weight to premature deaths in young 
ages than to those in the elderly population, it is also a good 
measure.
_ S^IgdJf(x+l/2 )
0 100000
eo=Expectation of life at birth.
X=Age.
dx=Number of people dying in a particular year of life.
More intuitively, expectation of life at age x can be expressed 
as a ratio between the total number of person years lived after 
exact age x (Tx) and the number of persons alive at exact age x 
(lx) see equation 3*.
-ex=Expectation of life at age x.
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x Ix 0 100000 0 100000
Both male and female life expectancy has risen markedly in Norway 
since the 1800s. Systematic improvements in hygiene and health, 
food production, vaccinations from infectious diseases, and a 
milder epidemic climate are the most accepted explanations for 
the rapid decrease in mortality in Norway until 1930.8
Figure 1. Expectation of life at birth in Norway
-For the period 1901-1990.
85
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65
6D
55
OQ>axw
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Year per Iod. 
ExpectatI on of IIfe, males. 
ExpectatI on oT ITTe, females.
Source: Official Statistics of Norway., 1993.
Data on life expectancy at birth are printed in figure 1. Life 
expectancy at birth has increased uniformly over the last twenty 
years. In 1991, life expectancy at birth was 74.01 and 80.09
12
years for men and women respectively. Since mortality among young 
people in Norway and other developed countries today is very low, 
it is mortality among the elderly that needs to be reduced to
achieve a higher life expectancy. It seems that the mortality
among the elderly is likely to fall somewhat, but that the 
increase in life expectancy will decline. Therefore, we cannot 
expect continuously rapid increases in life expectancy, and 
countries like Sweden, Norway, Iceland and Germany have 
experienced a stagnation in their life expectancies. 9
I started this section with a brief review of the economic 
consequences of population growth and its composition. Then I 
examined the growth equation, and made it clear that in Norway 
today it is the fertility level that causes most of the change in 
population growth. But if more immigrants are accepted, or the 
mortality rates among the elderly falls, net migration and
mortality will become increasingly important in explaining
population growth. Therefore, in the case of Norway, a study 
aimed at examining the fertility trend in the last thirty years 
with economic, social and political variables will be important 
in two ways. First, economists are interested in the way economic 
variables influence fertility. Second, the fertility rate alone 
causes changes in the population and its composition, which in 
turn will cause permanent changes in the economy as explained 
above.
1.3 The History of Norwegian Fertility.
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The total fertility rate in Norway was approximately 4.5 in 
1850. During the next one hundred years, the period fertility 
declined to 2.5, with a low of 1.78 children in 1935. This imply 
that Norway experienced a continuous decline in fertility during 
this one hundred year period, except for some small, but 
significant fluctuations (which is consistent with other 
developed countries). Why did this happen? There seems to be 
strong disagreements among professionals about this issue. 
Fortunately, however, there is more disagreement about each 
factors' relative influence on the fertility decline than about 
which factors were influential. The factors assumed to have 
caused this decline include: lower mortality, increased use of 
birth control, the industrial revolution, economic improvements, 
and family planning.
1.4 Proposed Reasons for the Fertility Transition.
Along with most other European countries, Norway experienced 
a concentrated fall in fertility during the transition from a 
pre-industrial agricultural society to an economically 
diversified modern society. Thus, one would expect 
industrialization to have some sort of influence on the fertility 
decline. The fundamental factor is the transition from a familial 
mode of production to a mode in which the labor market is 
external to the family . 1 0 This development transformed children
14
from productive farm laborers and a support to their elderly 
parents, into unproductive and costly investments. This 
explanation is perhaps the most credible for the rapid decline in 
fertility, both in Norway and the rest of Europe . 1 1 Along with 
industrialization, came urbanization. Mass education systems in 
urban areas further reduced the labor utility of children. In 
1850, 15.6 percent of the Norwegian population lived in urban 
areas, today approximately 72 percent of the Norwegian population 
lives in urban areas, and 25 percent of the total population 
lives in the three largest cities (Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim).
Also, increased monetization of the economy (particularly in 
urban areas) heightened the awareness of the cost of children in 
terms of purchasable goods, like clothes and food. These socio­
economic ideas about marital fertility decline are seen as 
economically rational. Pre-industrial (or transitional) societies 
are characterized by a net flow of goods from children to the 
older generation, whereas this direction is reversed during the 
transition. A moral legitimation of birth control and family 
planning programs emerged with the introduction of different 
contraceptive devices between 1880 and 1910.12 Lower mortality, 
in particular among children, reduced the demand for children 
because more young people survived to adulthood. In the early 
1940s, there was a dramatic increase in the total fertility rate. 
This trend lasted until 1970, and is called the baby boom 
experience. In each subsequent year the total fertility dropped 
and reached an all time low of just 1.66 in 1983, which is far
15
below the necessary replacement figure of 2.1 children. This baby 
bust is often seen as a timing phenomenon in Norway, because 
during this period female labor force participation and 
educational status increased enormously.
Professionals expected that this baby bust would be followed 
by an increase in the total fertility rate . 1 3 It was expected 
that births would be postponed because of the increase in labor 
force participation and education among women, but that the 
preference for children had not changed much and that the cohort 
total fertility rate would be relatively stable. This did occur, 
and the total fertility rate increased somewhat in late 1980s.
It is important to distinguish between the period total 
fertility rate and the cohort total fertility rate and their 
effects on both micro and macro levels. The cohort total 
fertility rate has some influence on both micro and macro levels. 
First, it is the cohort total fertility rate that determines the 
long run population growth. If the cohort total fertility rate is 
less than approximately 2 . 1  in the long run, the population will 
decrease if net immigration is zero. Second, the cohort total 
fertility rate reflects how many children the women born in the
I
same year or cohort have during their fertile years. The period 
total fertility rate determines the number of children born every 
year, and thus the cohort size. Large variations in the period 
total fertility rate cause, as I mentioned above, trouble for 
policy makers. An interesting approach is to examine the 
relationship between the period total fertility rate, and the
16
cohort total fertility rate. If one lag the cohort total 
fertility rate by 30 years (which is approximately the mean age 
of childbirth), one would expect the cohort total fertility rate 
and the period total fertility rate to be identical. If they are 
not equal, births are either postponed or accelerated. Figure 2 
takes this effect into consideration. If the period total 
fertility rate is higher (lower) than the cohort total fertility 
rate for any period, births are accelerated (postponed). 
Therefore, in Norway births were accelerated between 1950-1970 
and postponed between 1971-1990.
Figure 2. Period and cohort fertility.
-The cohort fertility is lagged 30 years.
3.5
.cu
2 . 5
>*-o
i_
CDXIEZJ
Z
19 7 1 -7 5  1 9 7 6 -8 0  1981-B 5 19B 6-901 9 5 1 -5 5  19 5 6 -6 0 196 6 -7 01 9 5 1 -5 5
5 Year per i o d .
Period fertility. Cohort fertility.
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1963-1992.
This reconstruction of Norwegian demographic history, is not 
much different from the history of other developed countries (or
17
at least Norway's neighboring countries). Therefore, it serves 
more as a motivation for the following econometric analysis, but 
first I would like to stress a very central question: can 
fertility be explained or analyzed with economic variables?
18
2.0 ECONOMIC THEORIES OF FERTILITY.
In economic theories of fertility, it is common to view the 
decision to have children in the same way as purchases of durable 
consumer goods. Economic theories of fertility are not meant to 
explain why couples have children (which is the concern of 
sociologists and psychologists) but rather how changes in 
economic variables can be expected to influence fertility. This 
is not different in principle from the economist's objective to 
explain demand for other durable goods, like cars and 
televisions. And as is the case with the demand for children, 
economists have less interest in (or rather, are not preoccupied 
with) why people buy such goods as cars and television. It is the 
changing demand as a function of prices and income that interests 
economists. Nevertheless, economic fertility theories are 
disputed matters. Critiques are often directed at the assumption 
of rationality. If one assumes rationality, one expects the 
family to make its best decisions based on all available 
information, which is often not the case.
2.1 The Family.
By a family, I mean a household composed of parents (husband 
and wife) and children from which the parents receive direct 
utility.14 A family unit makes several choices about its 
fertility. First, the family needs to decide how many children it
19
wants to have. Second, the family has to decide the quality of 
the children. By quality I mean the average level of expenditure 
per child as defined by Becker.15 Finally, it is important to 
determine the timing and spacing of births. These are all 
important issues that families must consider.
2.2 The Classical View of Fertility.
The idea that fertility is closely related to economic 
factors was promoted already in 1798 by Thomas Robert Malthus in 
his First Essay on Population. In this essay Malthus formulated a 
theory about the factors that influence fertility and mortality. 
In particular, he argued that an increase in family income (above 
subsistence) would increase fertility. This increase in fertility 
would be caused by two sources, Malthus argued. First, increased 
income would accelerate marriages and thus fertility. Second, the 
infant mortality rate would decline because of improved material 
standards. Malthus' more famous argument that populations tend to 
grow faster (geometrically) than food supply (arithmetically), 
along with his theory about positive and negative checks should 
require no explanation. Much has changed since Malthus developed 
his population theories: Most importantly, the industrial 
revolution changed family life, and possibly families1 
preferences.
2.3 More Recent Fertility Theories.
20
Today, it is common to divide the economic theories of 
fertility into two directions (or schools). One of the schools is 
represented by Theodore Schultz and Gary Becker, and is called 
the New Home Economics or the Chicago School. The main "rival" to 
the Chicago School is represented by Richard Easterlin, in which 
the Easterlin Hypothesis is central.
2.3.1 Theodore Schultz.
The importance of Schultz in the economics of fertility isj '
perhaps best stated by Willis (1987), I quote:
Theodore Schultz (1974) volume consolidated the 
theoretical work of the previous decade, struck of in new 
theoretical directions, and began to address the 
empirical content of the theory with the aid of large- 
scale micro data sets and new econometric methods, (see page 
69) .
Therefore, besides being an important family economist himself, 
Schultz also assembled much of the previous work in the field and 
made it available to the public. It was from this point the 
economics of the family emerged as a distinct subfield in 
economics. Even though Schultz made important and lasting 
contributions to family economics, he is probably best remembered
as one of the "forefathers" of endogenous growth.
21
2.3.2 Becker.
Becker (1960) was the first to utilize neo-classical 
consumer theory, in which the demand for children can be compared 
with the demand for durable consumer goods, to analyze fertility. 
This implies that it is possible to put a price on children. 
Important assumptions in this theory are, constant preference 
structures, rational behavior, that the demand for children has 
positive income elasticity, and that the families have to take 
price as given. Constant preference structures imply that 
preferences for children are constant over time. This, as I will 
explain later contradicts Easterlin's theories. The families have 
to take the prices as given because they are too small and have 
no market power.
Many empirical studies have been conducted to test whether 
or not the assumption about positive income elasticity can be 
verified, but have had mixed results.16 In order to explain 
these results, the quality of children was introduced into the 
respective families utility functions, along with the other 
arguments: number of children and other goods. This provides a 
partial explanation of why the number of children can be 
negatively related to income (and are therefore not inferior 
goods). The shadow price of quality (quantity) depends upon the 
quantity (quality). Quality is assumed to have higher income
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elasticity than quantity, but both are positive. An increase in 
income will therefore influence quality more than quantity, which 
implies that the shadow price of quality (quantity) decreases 
(increases). It is also reasonable to assume that the income 
elasticity for quality of children is higher among high income 
groups than low income groups (or among developed countries 
versus undeveloped countries). Becker also incorporates the cost 
of time in his fertility theories. He realizes that child rearing 
is time intensive, and that this usage of time has an opportunity 
cost. Becker’s coherent theory is mostly used in cross sectional 
empirical work to study differential fertility.
Butz and Ward (1979), made a noteworthy extension derived 
from the New Home Economics. They argued that a complex relation 
between male and female wages determines fertility. In 
particular, a woman’s participation in the labor force is viewed 
as a function of her own earning potential and her husbands 
earnings. If, as Butz and Ward assume, the household time inputs 
of husbands’ and wives' are gross substitutes, then an increase 
in the wage of one induce the other to substitute away from 
market work. Therefore, as female real wages increases, the 
opportunity cost of time spent with children will increase. The 
opportunity cost of women not in employment will be unaffected, 
but an increase in wages induces more females to enter the labor 
force at the expense of fertility. This, Butz and Ward argue, 
will lead to reduced childbearing and closer spacing of births. 
Male wages have the opposite effect on fertility. As male wages
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increase, the families budget constraints expands. Since both 
quality and quantity of children have positive income 
elasticities, both can be expected to rise. I utilize this 
approach in the empirical section of this paper. Intuitively, 
this reasoning can be explained in figure 3 Female wages above 
an imagined reservation level (wl) in l.a increases the time 
cost of children, reducing the birth probability. A similar 
argument can be used with male income, see l.b Below some 
level of male income (yl), the wife is in the work force.
Figure 3. Butz and Ward approadi.
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As male income rises within this range, the birth probability 
increase rapidly. Above (yl), the wife is out of work, and the 
response in birth probabilities will decline.
2.3.3 Easterlin.
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Whereas Becker's theories are mostly used to study cross 
sectional fertility, Easterlin's theories are used to explain 
time series (in developed countries). Easterlin argues that 
family preferences for children, their cohort size, and thus 
relative income determine fertility.
The relative cohort size is an essential argument in 
Easterlin's fertility theory. Easterlin argues that any 
relatively large cohort will be at significant economic 
disadvantage and that the opposite will hold for relatively small 
cohort sizes. Easterlin uses this argument in his influential 
book Population Labor Force and Long Swings in Economic Growth 
(19 68) to explain various economic, political, and social 
conditions. A particularly interesting argument that Easterlin 
gives is this
Both the postwar baby boom and the subsequent baby bust 
were in large part a product of swings in generation size 
that affected the economic circumstances of young 
adults. Because of their exceptionally favorable economic 
situation, those from the small generation of the 19 30s 
tended to marry earlier and have more children, the 
relatively unfavorable situation of the large generation 
of the 1950s made for later marriage and reduced 
childbearing.
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This hypothesis has received great attention from scholars in the 
past fourteen years, primarily because of its testability, but 
also because the hypothesis offers an alternative perspective to 
the Chicago School approach. The main difference is that the 
Easterlin approach synthesizes both economic and sociological 
factors, whereas the Chicago School primarily considers economic 
factors. Easterlin's assumptions are somewhat different from the 
Chicago School, and most importantly, Easterlin believes that 
preferences are changing over time. More specifically, Easterlin 
argues that preferences are shaped by people's childhood living 
standard experiences. The living standards in childhood are 
primarily determined by wages of fathers. Easterlin therefore 
uses young men's incomes in proportion to their fathers', as a 
measure of young men's living standards. Easterlin labels this, 
"relative income" and it deserves special attention I quote:
The argument so far can be summarized quite simply: as 
the relative income of young adults rises, they will feel 
less economic pressure and hence freer to marry and have 
children; as their relative income falls, they will feel 
increasing economic stress, and marriage and fertility 
will decline.
This definition is valuable to stress, because "relative income" 
is not, as many believe the same as real income. Since different
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age groups do not represent perfect substitutes in the labor 
market, young mens' "relative income" will tend to vary inversely 
with the number of young men to older men in a population. Thus, 
young couples' fertility can be expressed as an inverse function 
of their relative cohort size. The relative cohort size is not 
the only fertility influential variable according to Easterlin, 
but rather he stresses that its importance often has been 
neglected, or at least understated.
/a \ Recent income experience of young man(4) Relative income----------------- —--------- — ---- —----
Past income of young man's parents
Equation (4) is the Easterlin measure of relative income, 
but it is often measured as a ratio between old and young people 
in a population. As I explained above, Easterlin argues it is a 
good proxy for relative income. If this instrumental variable has 
the desired properties, empirical testing can be made about the 
relative income hypothesis. Since, according to Easterlin, the 
relative cohort size approximately twenty to thirty years ago 
influences the number of births today, his relative income theory 
can be used to make predictions about future populations.
A critique or an extension of the Easterlin approach has 
been suggested by Oppenheimer (1976).17 She accepted the basic 
hypothesis, but rejected the way Easterlin measures the standard 
of living. Oppenheimer argues that the standard of living a 
person experiences while growing up is influenced by other
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factors than just male wages. Among other factors, she argues 
that the number of children and female wages are influential. 
Consequently, Oppenheimer realizes that in order to measure 
relative income, all income should be considered. Relative cohort 
size, which Easterlin suggested as a measure of relative income, 
will therefore be misleading.
The Easterlin hypothesis can be counteracted somewhat by 
Sundts Law. The Norwegian priest and sociologist Eilert Sundt 
(1817-1875) discovered the following empirical relation: If the 
number of births in one period has been large, the number of 
births twenty to thirty years later will be large, because of the 
large share of females in reproductive ages twenty to thirty 
years later. If the number of births in one period has been low, 
the number of births twenty to thirty years later will be low, 
because of the small share of females in reproductive ages twenty 
to thirty years later.18 This phenomenon is called "generation 
waves" in demography.
From figure 4, in which the total fertility rate and the 
relative cohort size is presented for Norway for the period 19 62- 
1991, it is possible to get an initial impression of the 
relevance of the Easterlin hypothesis in Norway. It seems that 
when the relative cohort size is rather large, the total 
fertility rate is also large, thus supporting the Easterlin 
hypothesis. Some periods, however, do not fit this relation. The 
largest drop in the total fertility rate (between 1972 and 1977) 
took place when the relative cohort size increased from its all
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time low in 1972 to an average level in 1977. Following the 
period after 1977, the relative cohort size approached a stable 
level, but the total fertility rate fluctuated somewhat. Based on 
figure 4, it seems that the Easterlin hypothesis (if relevant) 
fits the period before 1972 better than the period after 1972.
Figure A . Total "Fertility rate & relative cohort size. 
-For the period 1962-1991.
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2.3.4 The Rivalry.
In the 1970s, the rivalry between the two approaches peaked. 
Several empirical studies of the Easterlin and New Home Economics 
models have been attempted with mixed results. To draw a
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universal conclusion about which model best fits the post-World 
War II data seems impossible. This division of economics of 
fertility into two schools was short lived. Sanderson (197 6) 
argued that the two schools have a lot in common. Among other 
things, both schools emphasize the importance of household budget 
constraints and biological factors like fecundity and freguency 
of intercourse. This may be true, but I think some superficial 
rivalry is still present between the two schools today.
Easterlin's critigue of Paul Schultz's review of "The Fertility 
Revolution" in Population and Development Review (1986) may 
illustrate this point, I guote:
To sum up briefly, what is fundamentally at stake here is 
the existence of two quite different theoretical 
perceptions of the fertility decision process: one 
influenced substantially by certain areas of demographic 
research, one faithful to certain preconceptions common 
in economics. This conflict reflects fundamental 
differences between demographers and economists that 
would benefit from more explicit recognition and 
confrontation, (see page 520).
This quotation clearly reflects that some sort of verbal rivalry 
is still present and that the two schools of thought are central 
focal points.
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2.4 Summary of the economic theories of fertility.
Economic theories of fertility became a distinct subfield in 
economics in the early 1970s. Easterlin, Becker and Schultz were 
among this field's pioneers. Today, economics of fertility is 
still a hot issue, and one can sense a change in attitude among 
the economists toward more interdisciplinary cooperation. This, 
however, has not stopped economic fertility models from becoming 
increasingly sophisticated mathematically.
3.0 PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL LITERATURE.
31
There is an enormous range of empirical economic work that 
aims at explaining the post-World War II baby boom and subsequent 
baby bust. Therefore to cover them all would be beyond the scope 
of this paper. I will therefore concentrate on those I find most 
relevant. It is natural to divide the next two subheadings into 
Easterlin related topics and New Home Economics fertility work.
3.1 Tests of the Easterlin Hypothesis.
Since the Easterlin hypothesis concerns demographers as well 
as economists, I found many articles about it in demographic and 
sociology journals. Easterlin himself recommends alternative 
approaches to test the relative income hypothesis (or the 
intergenerational taste formation) in Birth and Fortune. (1987). 
In this book, he uses the total fertility rate as a measure of 
young couples' fertility. The reason for this, he says, is that 
changes in the total fertility rate are dominated by changes in 
fertility among young females. As a measure of relative income, 
he uses the ratio between young and old men, or the relative 
cohort size. The relative cohort size is presented as a ratio of 
males aged 35-64 to males aged 20-34. Then he plots the data for 
both variables on a graph, and then concludes that the evidence 
supports the relative income hypothesis, both for the baby boom 
and baby bust in the U.S.
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Robert E. Wright has done several important studies of the 
Easterlin hypothesis in Canada and Europe.19 As a measure of 
fertility he uses the total fertility rate, and the relative 
cohort size is defined as the ratio of the male population age 
30-64 to the male population aged 15-29. Wright explains that the 
fertility trend in Belgium, England and Wales, Germany, Spain, 
Switzerland, and Norway have been the same during the period of 
1950-1985. In all the cases, Wright explains the trend as an 
inverted-U, with fertility increasing in the 1950s, reaching a 
peak in the 19 60s, and declining below the replacement level in 
the 1980s. He examined 16 European countries, divided into four 
subgroups: Western Europe, Northern Europe, Central Europe, and 
Southern Europe.
What he found universally, except for Finland and Greece, 
was that the fertility trend in all these European countries has 
been down since about 1965.20 Wright argued that the Easterlin 
hypothesis was not a valid hypothesis for most European 
countries. He gave two reasons for this belief. First, with the 
exception of four countries, the relative cohort size has been 
rising in the 1980s, whereas the total fertility rate has been 
decreasing. Wright also emphasized that the rather crude way the 
relative cohort size measures the relative income may invalidate 
the empirical results. Second, he applied a Granger test of 
causality to the relationship between the relative cohort size 
and fertility. The basic idea of such a test is simple. If the 
relative cohort size causes fertility, then changes in the
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relative cohort size should precede changes in fertility. For 
this to be true, two criteria must be met. First, the relative 
cohort size should help predict the total fertility rate. For 
example, in a regression of the total fertility rate to past 
values of the total fertility rate, the addition of past values 
of the relative cohort size as independent variables should 
contribute to the explanatory power of the regression. Second, 
the total fertility rate should not help predict the relative 
cohort size. If that is the case, it is likely that one or more
other variables are causing both the total fertility rate and the
relative cohort size. This can be tested with the Granger test, 
in which a restricted and an unrestricted model are estimated.
(5) UR: T F R = '2 i=1a T F R t _1 + 'L™-1$R CSt_1 + e t
(6) RRz TFR = 'L i=1a T F R t_1 + e t
-TFR=Total fertility rate. -RCS=Relative cohort size. 
-UR=Unrestricted model. -RR=Restricted model.
Wright applied this test to the European countries he 
studied and found it hard to determine the direction of causality 
between the total fertility rate and the relative cohort size in
most countries. He did find some support for the Easterlin
hypothesis in Belgium, England and Wales, France, Finland, and
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Italy. Data from the other countries provided no empirical 
support, and in some countries the causality was reversed which 
implies that the fertility rate causes the relative cohort size.
Ermisch (1979) tried to explain the relevance of the two 
schools of fertility theory in Great Britain. He tried to explore 
the importance of the two schools using time series data for the 
period 1955-75. Ermisch found that he had to reject the Easterlin 
hypothesis on the basis of relative cohort size as a measure for 
relative income. The variant of the Easterlin hypothesis 
presented by Oppenheimer, in which the relative economic status 
is a ratio between earnings of young men to total family income, 
did receive some support. Ermisch wrote:21
We are, therefore, unable to refute or confirm the 
Oppenheimer variant of the Easterlin hypothesis; while it 
does receive some support from the evidence of changes in 
the labor force participation rates of older married 
women, it is still an open question whether relative 
economic status, as defined by Oppenheimer is the 
dominant influence upon fertility, (see page 49).
Ermisch noted that the Oppenheimer approach is based on relative 
economic status, like the Easterlin approach. Therefore, since 
the Oppenheimer approach could not be refuted, the Easterlin 
theory is still intact, even though Easterlin's emphasis on 
relative cohort size as an instrumental variable for relative
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income was proven wrong.
Baird (1987) tests a multivariate time series model of 
fertility in France, England and Wales, Sweden, and the U.S. 
based on Easterlin's theories. The fertility model he tested can 
be written analytically as follows:
(7) F=f ( Y,A, R)
F=Birth rate.
Y=periodic economic effect.
A=Cohort labor market supply.
R=Relative employment status.
The period economic effect (Y) is lagged one year. This is done 
to include the waiting time to conception and nine months of 
pregnancy.22 The cohort labor market supply (A) is calculated 
with the help of four different age ratios of the male 
population. The relative employment status (R) is calculated for 
the whole time period, and 1950 was the base year.
The inclusion of both (A) and (R) as regressors in Baird's 
model may seem strange. The most common test of the Easterlin 
model would be to regress (A) on (F) alone. Baird, however, 
justifies the inclusion of (R) in the regressions:23
In some studies of the Easterlin model, the A regressor 
is made to stand alone for the measurement of relative
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economic status. Conceptually, however, cohort related 
market supply constraints and relative material 
aspirations are distinctly different components of 
relative economic status. Depending upon the history of 
economic growth, material aspirations trends may be 
treated independently of cohort labor market achievement 
potential, (see page 61).
Ordinary least squares were applied, and Baird found the relative 
employment status (R) to be significant. One problem though was 
the presence of first order auto-correlation. In order to remove 
the auto-correlation, Baird performed the Cochrane-Orcutt 
procedure. Baird's results of this operation provide support for 
the Easterlin model. In 13 out of 16 regressions, the (R) is 
significantly positive. Also, in France and the U.S. the (A) 
regressor is significantly positive, but in the Swedish and 
English regressions, no (A) regressions are significant. The (Y) 
regressor was insignificant in all the regressions, save one.
This implies that short run employment status (Y), or periodic 
economic effect, has no influence on fertility. In summary, the 
multivariate model tested by Baird supports the Easterlin model 
of fertility.
Pampel (1993) takes on an interesting approach to explain 
the Easterlin hypothesis. In particular, he argues that 
institutional structures, increased female labor force 
participation, and collective social protection influence the
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relative cohort size in different nations. In other words, Pampel 
argues that strong national commitment to full employment may 
limit the impact of cohort oversupply. Well established social 
benefit structures, like unemployment benefits, may further 
reduce the financial damage caused by oversupply of labor. The 
effect of female labor force participation compensates for the 
low male income in large cohorts. Therefore, changes in female 
labor force participation tend to reduce generational differences 
in economic status. These are the three arguments Pampel believes 
make up most of the differences among nations and perhaps render 
relative cohort size as a measure of relative income. Pampel 
studied the effects of relative cohort size on fertility in 18 
high-income industrial and democratic nations from 1951 to 
1986.24 He found that in general, the European countries did not 
support the Easterlin hypothesis. The reason for this, he 
explains, is that institutional and social features affect the 
degree of influence the relative cohort size has on fertility. 
Pampel reasons, I quote:25
By moderating the consequences of an oversupply of 
labor, such forces can hide the link between relative 
cohort size and fertility. European nations that emphasize a 
collectivist ideology of social protection may show weak 
relationship between relative cohort size and fertility.
(see page 511).
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As usual, support for the Easterlin hypothesis was found in The 
U.S. and Canada.
Jere R. Behrman and Paul Taubman (1989) examined the 
relative income hypothesis in the U.S. over two generations, and 
compared it to a Becker type of model with utility maximizing 
parents.26 Behrman and Taubman were among the first to examine 
the relative income hypothesis over two generations. This 
approach requires information on income and completed family size 
for two generations. Thus, their model is dependent upon 
comparable quantative time series data for a rather long perod. 
This may be the reason why so few academics have examined the 
relative income hypothesis over two generations.
The test did not provide much support for either of the 
models, but the Becker formulation proved to be the best. Again, 
the data quality must be questioned. Perhaps existing data are to 
poor to make qualified research.
3 . 2 Tests of the New Home Economics.
To present a comprehensive and correct discussion of the 
relevance of the New Home Economics based on empirical research 
is difficult. More theoretical experimentation or model building 
than empirical tests have been conducted, and consequently 
empirical tests have been approached somewhat differently. Two 
basic doctrines, however, have been central focal points, both of 
which are considered basic foundations of the New Home Economics.
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-Becker's analysis of demand for children with quality and 
quantity for children as central elements. The idea of altruistic 
parents must also be emphasized (see e.g., Becker and Barro 
(1988)). In this theory parents maximize a dynastic utility 
function that requires equality between marginal benefit and 
marginal cost of an additional child. Altruism implies that 
parents do not only receive utility from their own consumption 
but also utility from their offsprings consumption.27
-The Butz and Ward approach, or operationalization of the New 
Home Economics.
Both these theories have been discussed previously and need no 
further presentation. The problem though is that these two 
methods are closely related, and subsequently a discussion of one 
approach tends to be relevant to the other approach. This paper 
primarily considers the Butz and Ward approach, but the demand 
side should not be neglected.
John Ermisch examined time series data for the period 1950- 
1975 in Great Britain. 28He was particularly interested in the 
Butz and Ward approach to explain fertility trends. Butz and Ward 
reason that an increase in the husband's income will increase 
fertility, while an increase in the wife's opportunity cost of 
time (which is equal to the wage she earns, if she works) 
increases the cost of children. An increase in the opportunity
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cost of time decreases fertility since child care is time 
intensive. Ermisch found that the ratio of women's real wages to 
men's real wages was relatively stable in Great Britain for the 
period 1950-1969. After 1969, the ratio of women's wages to men's 
wages rose, causing a decline in fertility. This is in accordance 
with the Butz and Ward approach where an increase in the 
opportunity cost of time reduces the fertility.
Butz and Ward (1979) tested their theory and found strong 
positive indications that both female and male wages are 
important determinants of fertility. They found (using a 
loglinear model) that the elasticity of fertility with respect to 
male income is significantly positive and that the opposite is 
true for female wages (both at 5 percent level of significance). 
Indeed, in this article they went so far as to propose that a 
sufficiently large increase in female wages could cause 
countercyclical fertility.
Siegers (1980) tested the effect of income for husbands and 
the wages of wives on fertility using time series data for the 
Netherlands. Sieger found a negative effect on fertility for 
female wages and a positive effect for male income. In other 
words, Sieger's work provides support for the New Home Economics 
approach. He also tested the intergenerational taste formation 
model, but he found no support for this model.
Butz and Ward (1980) present a dynamic model of fertility 
behavior using time series data for the U.S. over the period 
1949-1975. They found that couples on the average try to avoid
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births when prospects for an increase in female wages are high, 
ceteris paribus. This is in accordance with their theory since an 
increase in expected female wage will raise their cost of time 
and, therefore, also change fertility rates.
3.3 Summary of Previous Empirical Findings.
Overall, there seems to be more support for the New Home 
Economics approach than for the Easterlin Hypothesis (at least in 
Western Europe). I am not quite sure if that necessarily implies 
that the New Home Economics approach is better and that the 
Easterlin approach should be discarded as a promising, but not 
fruitful approach. One must keep in mind that the Easterlin 
approach has been tested by professionals of several disciplines, 
and in a variety of different social science journals. The New 
Home Economics approach has mostly been tested in economics 
journals, and one can suspect, perhaps on unjustifiable grounds, 
that this may cause some bias. This bias may come about because 
of the nature of publication policy which tends to be more 
receptive to papers which assert positive results than those 
which provide inconclusive or negative ones.
4.0 EMPIRICAL DATA AND METHOD.
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I collected Norwegian time series data for several variables 
for the period 1962-1991 (this period is chosen because of the 
availability of data), but also because this period covers two 
important demographic regimes. Those are the so-called baby boom, 
which started in Norway during second World-War, and the 
subsequent baby bust that started around 1970, and continued into 
the mid-1980s. In the period after 1985 Norway, as well as 
several other developed countries, experienced increased 
fertility. I will present a short discussion of this period in a 
chapter about pronatalistic policies, and their possible impact 
on fertility.
Most of the time series data have been collected at 
Statistisk sentralbyra (Statistics Norway), which is the primary 
source for all the statistic material in this paper. Generally, 
the statistical information is unpublished material, however, 
where the statistics have been collected in published articles 
etc, I will note it.
The data quality presented in this chapter can be expected 
to be good. Norway along with Sweden were among the first 
countries in the world to collect coherent information on 
economic and demographic variables. Statistisk sentralbyra was 
established in 1832 as an independent register on demographic as 
well as economic variables. Even before 1832, registers on vital 
statistics (births, deaths and migration) were collected in
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Norway by religious authorities. Also, in 1935 Norway was the 
first country in the world to icorporate a complete input-output 
analysis into the registers (see Frisch (1934)).
4.1 Total Fertility Rate.
The total fertility rate for Norway is calculated with a 
period perspective. Therefore, as explained above, this measure 
does not necessarily reflect the fertility of a particular 
cohort. This is the dependent variable in the Easterlin 
hypothesis. I found Norwegian age specific fertility rates in the 
Norwegian Statistical Yearbook (1963-1992). Then I summarized the 
age specific rates which gave me the total fertility rates. These 
period fertility rates and the cohort fertility rates for the 
period of investigation were presented in figure 3.
4.2 Relative Cohort Size.
The publication "Folkemengdens bevegelse" SSB, contains an 
index of the relative cohort size (It) for the period 1962-1991. 
The relative cohort size is presented as a ratio of males aged 
35-64 to males aged 20-34 which is the ratio Easterlin suggests. 
This ratio is expected to be a good instrumental variable for 
relative income and is therefore used as the independent variable 
in the simple Easterlin relation. I assume that the relative 
cohort size and relative income are highly correlated, and in
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particular I assume that:
-The correlation between the relative cohort size and the error 
term approach zero as the sample size gets larger.
-The correlation between the relative cohort size and relative 
income is nonzero as the sample size gets larger.29
These assumptions need to be satisfied in order to make the 
relative cohort size a good instrumental variable for the 
relative income hypothesis.
4 . 3 Male and Female Wages.
To be able to incorporate the Butz and Ward approach, I 
collected data for male and female wages. These variables can be 
found in "Arbeidsmarkedsstatistikk" SSB, but only in nominal 
terms. I transformed the nominal variables to real variables, by 
dividing the nominal variables with the Laspeyres' consumer price 
index for the respective years (with 1970 as the base year).
Unfortunately, I was not able to obtain information about 
average male and female wages for the whole Norwegian population. 
My data are for industrial workers only, and therefore I expect 
the general trend in nominal wages among males and females to be 
somewhat downward biased. I propose two reasons for this:
45
-First, Industrial workers receive lower wages than other 
occupational groups, such as technical professions and skilled 
trades which require a higher degree of education. The 
homogeneity of industrial work also results in reduced bargaining 
power over wages since most industrial workers are substitutable.
-The wage gap between male and female wages in other occupational 
groups are traditionally greater than in industrial work. The 
main reason for this is that labor unions are stronger among 
industrial workers, and thus more able to protect female union 
members.
Figure 5. Male and female wages In Norway.
-For the perfod 1962-1991.
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Source: Arbeldsmarkedsunderaokelsen, 1993.
Figure 5 reveals that both male and female nominal wages have
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been rising for the period 1962-1991. Male wages have been higher 
than female wages for the whole period, but the wage gap has 
diminished over the period. According to the Butz and Ward 
approach, one could expect that the increase in male wages (or 
income as they actually proposed) would increase fertility (both 
quality and quantity) and that the increase in female wages would 
reduce fertility because of an increase in the cost of time. This 
is the case since the labor force participation among females in 
Norway is so high that it is reasonable to believe that a 
majority of Norwegian females will experience an increase in 
their cost of time (see table 1 for details).
Table 1. Female labor force participation
in Norway(for the ages 25-66 in percent).
Year: % employed:
1962 37.02
1965 38.11
1970 41.61
1975 48.69
1980 62.18
1985 68. 68
1987 74.42
Source: Arbeidsdirektoratet.
4.4 Child Benefits.30
In 1946, the Norwegian government introduced child benefits 
to parents with children under 16 years of age both for 
pronatalistic and social reasons. This financial assistance
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increased over the next 2 0 years, and today child benefits in 
Norway are an important integrated part of the welfare state. 
Because of the large variations in stability and purpose of child 
benefits in Norway during the period 1962-1991, I will discuss 
the benefits in three separate sections. Most of this discussion 
is based on data in Per Kolstad (1989, see endnote 30).
4.4.1 The Period 1962-1969.
During this period, there was a relatively stable
distribution of benefits. Households did not receive child 
benefits for the first child, whereas benefits per child (after 
the firstborn) increased. During both 1963 and 1967, the 
government pursued a progressive benefit strategy. In 1963, the 
child benefits increased by 8.3%, 21.8% and 35.78% for second, 
third and fourth children, respectively.
4.4.2 The Period 1970-1979.
In 1970, a financial benefit for the first child of 500 NOK
was granted. The child benefits for second, third, and fourth 
child increased by 228%, 189%, and 160% respectively and resulted 
in a less progressive benefit distribution. For the rest of this 
period there was a sustained decrease in real financial aid to 
children of all numbers with a few exceptions.
4.4.3 The Period 1980-1991.
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In 1980, there was a large increase in benefits that 
continued through the whole period (and which is continuing). The 
real percentage increase is largest for the first child, and then 
decreases with each child born to the same family. Therefore, 
during this period, the child benefit became even less 
progressive. The importance of a progressive distribution of 
child benefits will become evident in the section on population 
policies.
4.4.4 Application of Child Benefits Data.
It would be desirable to include in the regression procedure 
the effects of child benefits that are nonlinear functions of 
birth order. I have not done this for three reasons. First, child 
benefits that are nonlinear functions of birth order are 
difficult to obtain. Second, I expect child benefits that are 
nonlinear functions of birth order as independent variables in a 
regression procedure to be collinear. I believe this, because 
there is some sort of colinearity between the benefit variables. 
Among other things, the benefit variables tend to increase with 
approximately the same percentage over time. Finally, several 
independent benefit variables would make the regression procedure 
very complex. In this paper I am interested in the aggregate 
effects of child benefits on fertility and therefore I am not
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concerned with differentiated child benefits. However, as long as 
the demand for children is higher than actual fertility, all 
forms of children benefits can be expected to be positively 
related to fertility. It has been argued that the real child 
benefits for second children should be positively related to 
fertility experiences in developed countries (at least in 
countries with a total fertility rate below two),31 This line of 
thinking is as follows: an increase in the real child benefits 
for second children gives one child households stronger 
incentives to have a second child, because of the potentially 
improved economic conditions.
Figure 6. Child benefit for second child In real NOK. 
-For the period 1962-1991.
5
A
3
2
1
0
19*9 1970 1971 1978 1979 1974 1979 197S 1977 1979 1979 1910 1991 1?i? ISIS 19B7 tan 19B9 1990
Year period. 
Rea I NOK .
S o u rce : S t.a t.rs t re a l  y e a r  book j 1 9 9 3 .  
Consumer p r fc e  fndex 197 9=100 .
50
It is also reasonable to assume that in countries in which 
the total fertility rate is somewhere between two and three, 
increased real child benefits for the third child can be expected 
to raise total fertility if economic factors are relevant for 
households decision making. The child benefits for second 
children has increased uniformly over the period 1962-1991 (in 
nominal terms), with an extraordinary large increase in 1970. The 
general trend has also been rising in real terms for the period 
but with some periods of stagnation and decline (see figure 5).
4.5 Unemployment Insurance.
Unemployment insurance is paid on a monthly basis to 
registered unemployed people in Norway (see Figure 7). In order 
to be eligible for this type of benefit, laborers need one year 
of full time work experience. If this criterion is not met, 
laborers have the opportunity to get subsistence benefits from 
the local authority. Unemployment benefits in Norway are at such 
high levels that some economists have called for revisions of the 
unemployment insurance system because they expect that potential 
laborers put less effort into job search when they receive 
unemployment insurance.
Another problem is the rather high minimum wage for young 
workers which makes this group less attractive to employers. The 
most important problem though is the dramatic increase in 
duration of unemployment in Norway in more recent years (see
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table 2). Unemployment insurance is used as a stabilizing 
instrument in macroeconomic policy but also for social reasons' 
to provide purchasing power for unemployed people.
Figure 7. Unemployment insurance in Norway. 
-For the period 1962- 1991, in real terms.
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Table 2. Average duration (in weeks) of unemployment for the 
years 1989-1992.
Year: 1989 1990 1991 1992
Duration: 23 30 31 33
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1993.
The effects that unemployment insurance may have on fertility are
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not obvious. Several possible paths of development seem possible, 
depending on male and/or female unemployment in the household. A 
simple illustration of the effects of unemployment insurance 
reveals this uncertainty. In a household, there are three 
possible unemployment situations'. First an unemployed man, an 
unemployed woman, and two unemployed adults.
-In households with unemployed males, unemployment insurance will 
moderate the financial loss because of unemployment. Or, 
inversely, increase the household budget (over the subsistence 
benefits) and thus also the consumption possibilities. If one 
assumes, like Becker, that children have positive income 
elasticities, either child guantity, quality, or both will 
increase if the male in the household receives unemployment 
insurance. If the income effect for quantity is higher than the 
income effect for quality, fertility will increase (and more than 
quality).
-In households with unemployed females, the effect of 
unemployment insurance may be different. An important aspect of 
both male and female unemployment insurance is that the 
unemployed do not have to work at all: This gives the unemployed 
people a great deal of leisure time. This leisure time may result 
in more births since the woman now has more time disposable to 
give for childrearing (without experiencing a loss of income).
53
-In the case where both are unemployed, the effect of 
unemployment insurance on fertility is hard to predict. The 
increased leisure time may increase fertility because of a 
reduction in the alternative cost of time, and reduce fertility 
through the detrimental effect of unemployment.
4 . 6 Availability of Kindergartens.
As I have already discussed, child care is time intensive. 
Traditionally, the wife in a household is the one that has to 
sacrifice career and education to take care of the children.
Often a choice must be made between bringing up children or 
pursuing a career. With increased female wages, the opportunity 
cost of children increase, and as a consequence one can expect 
the demand for children to go down. With increased access to day 
care services for children, this picture can change.
I collected time series data for seats in kindergartens per 
1000 children under seven years. This is the age at which most 
children need day care. For example 400 seats available in 
kindergartens per 1000 children under seven years implies a 40 
percent kindergarted coverage.I expect that an increase in seats 
in kindergartens per 1000 children will have a positive effect on 
fertility. As seats in kindergartens increase, families have the 
opportunity to put away their children in day care services, and 
spend their time on other business. Over the period 1962-1991, 
the number of seats available in kindergartens per 1000 children
54
increased from 20 to 399 (see figure 8). Over this period Norway 
also experienced the greatest increase in female labor force 
participation.
Figure 8. Number of seats aval Iable In kindergartens. 
-Per 1000 chi Idren.
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4 . 7 Number of Female Students.
The number of female students in universities and equivalent 
institutions in Norway exploded over the period 1962-1991. In 
1962, there were 2778 female students at university level in 
Norway, whereas in 1991, there where 35575 students (see Figure 
9). This has occurred because of better job opportunities (and 
higher wage potentials) and the female rights movement in Norway
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during the 1970s.32 It is also reasonable to assume that 
improvements in day care for children has had some positive 
influence.
Figure 9. Number of female students.
-In higher education.
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An increase in the number of female students in higher 
education can be expected to result in postponements of births 
(and also in reduction in the cohort fertility rates). This is 
because, for most females, childrearing and studying is hard to 
combine. The economic situation for most female students is also 
different from other females. Female students tend to marry 
later, and thus they have less economic support than married 
females at the same age. It has also been established that 
females in higher education place more emphasis on personal self
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fulfillment, and consequently, children play a less important 
role in their lives.33
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for all variables 
discussed in chapter 4. All variables have 30 observations, and 
the variables cover the same period.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for all variables.*
Variable:
N: St. Dev. Mean Max: Min:
Total fertility rate: 30 0.4801 2.16 2.93 1.65
Relative cohort size: 30 0.1332 1.77 2.17 1.61
Male wage 30 29.458 38.6 99.51 7 .39
Female wage: 30 25.691 31.81 86.67 5.09
Female education: 30 8500.2 14752 35575 2778
Child benefit: 30 3155.2 3458.1 10600 360
Kindergarten seats: 30 127.62 149.26 399 20
Unemployment benefit:
-------------*  ' V 1 n r- _ • -
30 14909 13852 42101 1039
measured in number of children. Unemployment benefit, child 
benefit, female wage and male wage are measured in Norwegian 
Kroner (NOK). Female education is measured in total number of 
females, whereas the kindergarten variable is measured in seats 
per 1000 children under seven years.
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5.0 EMPIRICAL RESULTS.
In this chapter both the Easterlin Hypothesis and a more 
complex model with elements from the New Home Economics approach 
will be tested using Norwegian time series data presented in a 
previous chapter. Most of the discussions evolves around the 
Easterlin primarily because the Easterlin hypothesis was created 
to explain the baby boom and the subsequent baby bust period 
(which is exactly the period of investigation), but also because 
I have taken several demography classes in which the Easterlin 
hypothesis was central. The respective models' relevance will be 
discussed, and conclusions will be drawn. Then I will make 
mention of the limitations of each model, and their effect on the 
outcome. Finally, I will make some concluding remarks and give 
guidelines for future research on the economics of fertility.
5.1 General Problems.
A question of significance is the adequacy of a time lag of 
one year to account for the response in fertility. Both Wright 
(1989) and Ermisch (1982) set the effective lag length equal to 
one year, and in general this seem to be the accepted approach 
among most economists. I argue that an effective lag length of 
one year is too short because it fails to take into account the 
waiting time to conception as defined by Bongaarts (1983), I 
quote:
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The data in table 2 suggests average conception waits 
ranging from five to ten months, with typical values near 
seven months. This generalization applies to women in their 
twenties; waiting times tend to be longer for younger women 
in the years immediately following menarche presumably 
because the incidence of anovulatory cycles is then higher.
(see page 110).
If one takes the waiting time to conception into account, it 
should be obvious that a one year lag is too short. Presumably, 
the correct lag should be one and a half years, but because such 
data are hard to find, I propose a two year effective lag. 
Therefore, all the following empirical models will be estimated 
with both one and two year lags, and a comparison will be made. I 
also estimated most of the models with three years effective lag, 
in general these models are not able to improve the fit or the 
significance of the respective variables.34
5.2 The Easterlin Model.
I used ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate a log linear 
relation between the total fertility rate and the relative cohort 
size. I did this for two reasons. First, most of the previous 
empirical work concerning the Easterlin hypothesis tends to 
include log linear models. Second, log linear models have several 
desirable properties which I will explain below. The equations
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are:
(8) l n T F R t. = a 1 + a 2ln R C S t._1 + e c t=1 9 6 2 1 9 9 1 .
(9) l n T F R c = $ 1 + $ 2ln R C S t._2 + e t t=1962,...,1991.
Table 4 contains the results from the estimation procedures with 
both one and two years lag. Since I applied log linear models, 
the dependent variables (relative cohort size) will be in 
elasticity form and therefore unit free. Consequently, a one 
percent increase in the relative cohort size for the one and two 
years lag models will yield a 1.8 percent and 1.91 percent 
increase in the total fertility rate respectively.
From table 4 one can see that the relative cohort size is 
significant because of high t-statistics both when lagged one and 
two years. The t-statistics for the relative cohort size are 
positively significant at 0.0003 and 0.0001 level for the one and 
two year lag models respectively, and thus the results support 
the Easterlin hypothesis. The Adj R-sq is 0.361 when the relative 
cohort size is lagged one year and 0.458 when lagged two years. 
This implies that in both models the independent variables (in 
this case just the relative cohort size) are capable of 
explaining about forty percent of the variation in the total 
fertility rate. This is relatively good considering that the 
relative cohort size is the only independent variable in both 
regressions. The t-values reveal that the relative cohort size is
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more significant in the model in which there is a two year lag: 
Also the variance in the total fertility rate is better explained 
by the two year lag model. Both these observations support my 
claim that a two year lag model does a better job than a one year 
lag model to explain the variance in the total fertility rate.
Table 4. Comparison of the statistical significance of 
the Relative cohort size using log linear models 
lagged one and two years respectively.*
Variable:
One year lag Two year lag
Relative cohort size: 1.800 1.910
(4.101) (4.886)
Intercept: -0.293 -0.370
(-1.15) (-1.63)
Adj R-sq: 0.3610 0.4587
Number obs: 28 27
Dw-statistic: 0.099 0.115
Dw-Critical: 1.
- .. .. 'W, •
33-1.48 1.32-1.47
XA11 t-statistics are given in parentheses.
The presence of a high degree of positive serial 
correlation, however, makes the above discussion more 
complicated. Serial correlation will not affect the unbiasedness 
or the consistency of the estimators, but it will affect the 
efficiency. This loss in efficiency implies that the standard 
errors obtained from the OLS procedure will be smaller than the
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true standard errors. This will lead to the conclusion that the 
parameters estimated are more accurate than they actually are. 
This invalidates the t-tests of the parameters.
The observed Durbin Watson statistic (DW statistics) for the 
one and two year lag models are 0.099 and 0.115 respectively. For 
both models an observed value for DW below the low critical value 
allows me to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. 
If the DW observed is greater than the high critical value, I 
will retain the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. An 
observed DW in the range between the low and high critical values 
leaves me with inconclusive results. From table 4 where both the 
DW observed and the DW critical values are reproduced I realize 
that a high degree of positive serial correlation is present.
A method that is widely used to correct for positive serial 
correlation in econometric work is to present the variables, both 
dependent and independent, in first differences of their natural 
logarithms.35 Therefore the second model type I estimated is in 
first differenced form and looks like equation (10) and (11).
(10) blnTFRc = y1+y2blnRCSt_1 +et t=1962, . . . , 1991.
(11) blnTFRt = C1 + t2dlnRCSt_2+et t=1962,...,1991, 
where blnTFRt = lnTFRt-lnTFRt_1 A blnRCSt = lnRCSt- lnRCSt_x
The results of these estimation procedures are reproduced in
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table 5. Whereas the regression procedure reproduced in table 4 
provided unconditional support to the Easterlin hypothesis, the 
results reproduced in table 5 provide no support for the 
Easterlin hypothesis. As one can see, the relative cohort size 
is, statistically insignificant, when lagged both one and two 
years because of the low t-values even though the relative cohort 
size is still positively related to the total fertility rate.
Table 5. Comparison of the statistical significance of
the Relative cohort size using first differenced 
log linear models lagged one and two years 
respectively.*
Variable:
One year lag Two year lag
Relative cohort size: 0.115 0.330
(0.470) (1.364)
Intercept: -0.014 -0.013
(-2.239) (-2.087)
Adj R-sq: 0.0297 0.0320
Number obs: 27 26
DW-statistic:
— - - . . • . •
0.727 0.698
*A11 t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
First differences of natural logarithms implies 
( 61nRCSt=lnRCSt-lnRCSt-i ) .
The Adj R-sq is also very low in both cases, which implies 
that only a small part of the variance in the total fertility 
rate can be explained by the relative cohort size. The DW are
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still low, which may suggest that a more complex form of 
correlation between the residuals may be present. Even though 
this model clearly refutes the Easterlin argument, the two year 
lag model has a Slightly higher Adj R-sq, and the relative cohort 
size has a higher t-value than one year lag model. This again
supports the use of a two year lag model in econometric fertility
analysis.
Based on a graphical presentation in one of the previous 
chapters (see figure 4 page 28), I noted that if relevant, the 
Easterlin hypothesis seems to fit the period before 1972 better 
than the period after 1972. An interesting aspect of this is that 
in the period before 1972 the relative cohort size was high by 
most standards, and in the period after 1972 the relative cohort 
size was low. Is this merely a coincidence, or is it a structural
pattern which can be confirmed by empirical estimation. Based on
figure 4 on page 28, I create a casual hypothesis that high 
values of the relative cohort size behave according to the 
Easterlin hypothesis, whereas small values do not.
The reason why I divided the data in high and low 
observations of the total fertility rate is simply because that 
approach will give more information than estimation of a pre 1972 
model and a post 1972 model. This is so, since a model estimation 
that only includes high values for the relative cohort size will 
also contain most observations of the relative cohort size before 
1972. Stated differently, a pre and post 1972 model examination 
will explain if the period before 1972 behaves according to the
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Easterlin Hypothesis, whereas a high and low model examination 
will explain why. Therefore, I divided the thirty year period 
into two different parts, one period dominated by high values for 
the relative cohort size, and one dominated by low values for the 
relative cohort size. Then I ran two separate log linear 
regressions represented by equations (12) and (13).
(12) ln T F R H1=x\l  + r \2ln R C S H1_1 +eH1
(13) ln T F R Lo= e i + 6 2ln R C S LO_l +eLo
The results are reproduced in table 6.
Table 6 reveals an interesting pattern. Low values for the 
relative cohort size regressed on the total fertility rate 
completely contradict the Easterlin hypothesis. Not only is the 
t-value for the relative cohort size low, but its relation to the 
total fertility rate is also the opposite of what Easterlin 
predicts. The Adj R-sq is also low.
On the other hand, the explanatory power associated with 
high values of the relative cohort size is diametrically 
opposite. The t-statistic are high and positive as predicted by 
Easterlin. Also, the Adj R-sq is very high for a model with only 
one independent variable. Thus, the casual hypothesis is 
confirmed by the data. A partial explanation for this may be the 
birth timing effects caused by female labor force participation 
and female education which the simple Easterlin relation fails to
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take into account. As discussed previously (see page 14) this 
may, in fact, be a reasonable explanation.
Table 6. The significance of the relative cohort size using 
log linear models, when relative cohort size is 
divided in high and low observations.*
Variable:
One year lag Two year lag
Low levels:
Relative cohort size: -1.776 -1.044
(-0.808) (-0.518)
Intercept: 1.651 1.233
(1.432) (1.058)
Adj R-sq: 0.0560 0.0238
Number obs: 12 12
High levels:
Relative cohort size: 2.944 2.865
(8.039) (7.915)
Intercept: -1.047 -1.000
(-4.617) (-4.442)
Adj R-sq: 0.8196 0.8259
Number obs:
................  ... - ...  1 . 1.
14 13
*All t-statistics are given in parenthesis.
The Adj R-sq is also very high for a model that has only one 
independent variable. I do not know if this is a pattern unique
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in Norwegian time series data, but if not, these results surely 
provide an interesting insight into the Easterlin hypothesis. 
Among other things, the Oppenheimer approach to the Easterlin 
Hypothesis may be more adequate than the relative cohort size 
approach.
A problem that is common in all science is determining 
whether changes in one variable are a cause of changes in another 
variable. For example, do changes in the relative cohort size 
cause changes in the total fertility rate? One approach to this 
question is a test of causality developed by Granger and Sims.
The basic ideas of such a test have been discussed in chapter 3.1 
page 32, and deserve no further attention. I estimated an 
unrestricted and a restricted form of the Easterlin model to test 
for causality or whether the relative cohort size causes the 
total fertility rate.
(14) UR:lnTFRt=Y?k.1*iklnTFRt_k+Y;k,1t2klnRCSt_n_k + et n=2.
(15) RR: lnTFRt = EL ilklnTFRt_k + et
Equations (14) and (15) represent the hypothesis (HI) that the 
relative cohort size cause changes in the total fertility rate. 
Since the observed F-values are greater than the critical F-value 
(see table 7) for both the two and three year effective lag 
models, I fail to reject the (HI) hypothesis that the relative
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cohort size causes the total fertility rate. Even though this 
observation supports the Easterlin line of thought, I also need 
to test the inverse Easterlin relation: that the total fertility 
rate causes the relative cohort size. Equation 16 and 17 
represent the hypothesis (H2) that the total fertility rate 
causes the relative cohort size.
(1 6 ) UR: lnRCSt-YZrt. K2*lnTFRt_n_k + et a - 2  .
(17) RR:lnRCSt= =i XlklnRCSt_k + et
Table 7. Results of Granger causality tests of the
relationship between RCS (Relative cohort size) and
T F R  (Total 
effective
fertility 
lags.
rate). m is the number of
m=2 N=2 6 m=3 N=25
Null
hypothesis: F (2,24) F (3,23) Fobs ^  Fop it
H i : RCS-^TFR 14.64 7.60 Yes Yes
H2: TFR-»RCS 11.27 3.53 Yes Yes
F crit 3.4 3.03
All F-tests are at five percent significance.
Since the observed F-values are greater than the critical F-value
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for both the two and three year effective lag models, I fail to 
reject the (H2) hypothesis that total fertility rate causes the 
relative cohort size.
Failure to reject this hypothesis indicates that the 
relationship between the total fertility rate and the relative 
cohort size is likely to be spurious. Acceptance of causation in 
both directions indicates a potential feedback effect36, and 
should not be expected. Therefore, the Granger test of causality 
provides evidence against the Easterlin hypothesis.
5.3 New Home Economics Model.
A brief summary of what has been established in chapter 4. 
about the relation between the independent variables and the 
dependent variable may be appropriate. First, male wages (which 
is used as an instrumental variable for male income) is expected 
to be positively related to fertility. An increase in wages will 
increase consumption possibilities, and since the demand for 
children has positive income elasticity, fertility will increase.
Female wages is expected to be negatively related to the 
total fertility rate since the opportunity cost of time spent 
with children will increase. The conjecture that female wages are 
negatively related to fertility is just an empirical proposition 
advocated by Butz and Ward (1979), I quote:
An increase in the wife's wage has an income effect
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proportional to her hours worked in the market place, in 
addition to a pure price effect - the usual Slutzky 
decomposition. The sum of these two effects may be positive 
or negative. An obvious feature of this formulation is that 
the income effect may grow over time if women's hours are 
trending upward - for example, if working women move from 
part-time to full-time employment. We have ignored this 
element in our model, (see page 321).
Female wages and male wages in equation (18) represent the Butz 
and Ward approach.
Female education is expected to be negatively related to the 
total fertility rate. This is so, since female students tend to 
marry later, and their economic situation is often worse than 
other females at the same age.
Child benefits will improve the economic situation of 
potential parents. This improvement can be expected to give 
incentives to potential parents to have children. Therefore, 
child benefits is hypothesized to be positively related to the 
total fertility rate.
An increase in availability of kindergarten seats implies 
that parents can have children, and pursue other activities than 
child care at the same time. Therefore, an increase in 
kindergarten seats per 1000 children under seven years is 
expected to be positively related to the total fertility rate.
Finally, unemployment benefits may insulate workers from the
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financial risk of unemployment. Since economic stability/support 
is an important argument for families when they make their 
decisions about having children, unemployment benefits are 
hypothesized to be positively related to the total fertility 
rate.
Table 8 summarizes the effect my so-called New Home 
Economics model has on the total fertility rate. The estimated 
model looks like equation (18).
(18 ) TFRt + V-2X 1 t-n * ^ 3X 2 t-n * PiX 3 t-n + P 5X 4 t-n * l*6X5c-n * +ec
Where n=1,2. t=1962,...,1991.
Variable: Expected Relationship:
Xl=Male wages. (+)
X2=Female wages. (-)
X3=Female education. (-)
X4=Child benefit. ( + )
X5=Seats in kindergarten. (+)
X6=Unemployment benefit. (+)
-The signs in the parentheses reflect the hypothesized signs of 
the different variables.
Most importantly, the Butz and Ward approach to explaining 
fertility trends seem to be supported in Norwegian time series
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data for the period 1962-1991. Female wages are negatively 
related to the total fertility rate, and significant at a 5 
percent level. Male wage is positively related to the total 
fertility rate, and significant at a 5 percent level.
As explained previously, Butz and Ward argue that male 
income should be positively related to the total fertility rate. 
And since the male wage is linearly related to male income by the 
hours worked, it is also reasonable to expect that male wage is 
positively related to the total fertility rate. One can expect,
however, that male wage as an instrumental variable for male
income is biased slightly upward since the numbers of hours 
worked has decreased uniformly over the whole period.
For both male and female wages, the two year lag model 
yields more statistically significant coefficients (or 
equivalently, higher t-statistics), and the Adj R-sq is also 
slightly higher in the two year lag model. This again supports 
the usage of two year lag models in econometric fertility models.
The other variables, which according to theory can be
expected to influence the total fertility rate, are less
successful in explaining fertility movements. The number of 
females in higher education is expected to be negatively related 
to the total fertility rate. This hypothesis is confirmed by the 
regression procedure, and the variable is significant at a 10 
percent level. The availability of seats in kindergartens is 
expected to be positively related to the total fertility rate. 
This hypothesis cannot be confirmed by Norwegian time series data
even though the coefficient is positively related to the total 
fertility rate. An explanation for this result may be the 
relatively crude way in which the kindergarten variable is 
measured.
Table 8. OLS model on: Male and female wages, child
benefits, seats in kindergarten, unemployment 
benefits, females in higher education. TFR is 
still the dependent variable.*
Number of lags.
Variable:
1 Year. 2 Year.
Male wage: 311.3858
(1.896)
600.3743
(3.942)
Female wage: -486.3607
(-2.519)
-753.3874
(-4.177)
Female edu: -0.256152
(-2.075)
-0.210125
(-1.629)
Child benefit: 0.000581
(2.334)
-0.00006
(-0.223)
Kindergarten: 0.025084
(1.028)
0.019649
(0.933)
Unempl. benef: 0.038140
(0.839)
0.115038
(2.939)
Intercept: 23.70002
(3.234)
2.170511
(0.326)
Number of obs: 29 28
Adj R-sq: 0.8558 0.8673
DW-statistic:
- 1 -r , -
0.910 1.130
*A11 t-values are presented in parentheses.
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Among other points the demand side for seats in kindergartens is 
not even considered. Unemployment benefit can be assumed to be 
positively related to the total fertility rate. This hypothesis 
is confirmed in the two year lag model, but not in the one year 
lag model.
The last independent variable, child benefits, is, as 
expected, positively related and significant at low levels for 
the one year lag model. In the two year lag model the effect of 
child benefits on the total fertility rate is reversed, which 
contradicts what I would expect. The t-statistic, however, 
explains that even though unemployment benefits in the two year 
lag model seems to be negatively related to the total fertility 
rate, the coefficient is not significant.
The Durbin-Watson statistics indicate that there may be a 
problem with positive serial correlation in both the one and two 
year lag models which may cause the t-statistics to be 
overstated. However, the DW observed in both the one and two year 
lag models are in the grey or indeterminate area, which may be 
due to serial correlation in the independent variables and not in 
the error terms. I also estimated a semi log relation of this 
model. Generally the results were the same, but the coefficients 
were less significant.
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6.0 POPULATION POLICIES.
By "population policies", I mean deliberate action 
undertaken by the government to influence the size, the age 
structure, the regional distribution, and the growth of a 
population. The most common instruments in population policy are:
-Immigration regulations.
-Different laws concerning abortion.
-Information and distribution of contraceptive devices.
-Child benefit.
-Other financial transfer devices.
-Medical\healthcare.
Population policies can be undertaken to reduce fertility 
(as in China and India) or to increase fertility (as in Germany 
before and during World War II, and in Italy and France today).
In economic and sociological terminology, population policies 
undertaken to increase fertility are labeled pronatalist. In most 
developed countries today, the fertility rate is far below the 
replacement level. This implies a decrease in population in the 
future, ceteris paribus. In order to stabilize, or increase a 
population, governments may want to pursue a pronatalistic 
policy. A pronatalist policy can embrace two major strategies. 
First, restrictions on access to contraceptive devices can be 
established. Second, an attempt to influence attitudes toward
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childbearing and childrearing through provisions of financial 
incentives can be made.37 However, there are several moral 
issues associated with pronatalist policy that may serve as a 
partial explanation why most Western European countries have been 
reluctant to pursue active pronatalist policy. First, Western 
European governments are reluctant to disturb the basic human 
right of family size choice. Second, following the Malthusian 
population doctrine and the persistent view in genetics 
concerning heredity and the quality of a population, those that 
are opposed to pronatalistic policy argue that any fertility 
increase would take place among the poor and the inferior. Third, 
many feminists see pronatalism as a means of restoring male 
superiority by forcing women back into the kitchen. Finally, 
there is also an economic justification problem associated with 
pronatalistic policy. Generally, pronatalist policy incurs costs, 
whereas the produced benefits associated with pronatalist policy 
are hard to establish with certainty.
Antinatalist policies are pursued in most undeveloped and 
developing countries in Southeast Asia and Africa today. The main 
goal of antinatalist policies is to reduce fertility, with 
familiy planning programs as the major policy instruments.
6.1 The Effects of Pronatalistic Policy.
Some empirical studies have been conducted that reveal the 
effect of pronatalistic policies in developed countries. Most of
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these case studies show that pronatalistic policies have little 
or no effect on fertility. Brunborg (1985), found pronatalist 
policy to influence fertility positively with approximately 10 
percent in Norway. All other empirical studies I examined, with 
the exception of Hwang (1990), found pronatalist policies to have 
less effect on fertility. Hwang discussed the importance and 
differences in desired family size and actual family size. In 
particular he established that as long as desired family size is 
close to actual family size, pronatalist policy will have little 
or no effect. Inversely, if the desired family size is 
significantly greater than actual family size, pronatalist policy 
may be effective. In a case where the desired family size is 
lower than the actual family size, family preferences and 
attitudes for children need to be influenced in order to increase 
fertility. In the early 1980s, desired family size was 
significantly greater than actual family size for all age groups 
in Norway (with the exception of the age group 16-20, desired 
family size was approximately at replacement level)38. This may 
explain the large impact Brunborg found pronatalist policy to 
have on fertility in Norway.
6.2 Immigration Policy.
Immigration policies have been pursued successfully in the 
U.S for a long period of time. More recently, however, illegal 
immigration from Mexico and the Caribbean islands in particular,
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have caused problems for the U.S. government. Historically, 
immigrants tend to be a very select group. The immigrants to the 
U.S. in the 19th century were chiefly young, resourceful men and 
women (even today this is true). This made the population 
composition or age structure in the U.S. advantageous since most 
people were in the working and childbearing ages, and thus able 
to support themselves. Today, immigrants are still young and 
resourceful, but also usually well educated, richer and more 
ambitious than non migrants. Therefore, in order to counteract 
the aging of the population as well as depopulation caused by low 
mortality and low fertility in developed countries, migration 
policy may be a valid instrument.
An argument often advocated by those that oppose immigration 
is that the young immigrants will grow old one day, and to accept 
immigrants just implies a postponement of the age structure 
problem. That argument is just partly true. A stable positive net 
migration of young adults implies a larger labor force than would 
have been the case without a positive net migration.
In order to be able to discuss the relevance and importance 
of the migraton policy in Norway it would be helpful to examine 
the basic principles underlying Norwegian immigration policy. 
These basic principles are:39
-A relatively strict control of immigration. (Norway has 
practiced an immigration ban since 1975).
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-All applicants for immigration should be treated equally, 
regardless of sex, religion, race, education and so on.
-All kinds of refugees (political, religious, war) are treated on 
an individual basis, and are generally accepted.
-International commitments. These commitments include special 
treatment of refugees and other non priveleged immigrants.
Foreign citizens intending to stay in Norway for more than 6 
months are registered in the Central Population Register (CPR). 
All people intending to stay in Norway for more than six months 
receives an identification number. That number is used in all 
statistical sources on the individual level, and makes analyzing 
of behavior possible. Therefore, Norwegian society is 
continuously surveyable, which makes the Norwegian data somewhat 
unique, at least in European context. From 1987, all types of 
asylum seekers are also included in this register.
Norway has maintained a relatively strict immigration policy 
since the 1960s. There are several reasons for this. Among other 
points, Norwegians are somewhat sceptic of foreign influence and 
conservation of their natural peculiarities are highly valid 
arguments to most Norwegians. This is perhaps why Norway still is 
being referred to as Europes best kept secret. Also most 
Norwegians are concerned with the prospect that imported cheap 
labor may lead to a reduction in the wage level, and in the worst
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scenario, to unemployment. Generally, there has also been an 
increasing hostility towards "visible" immigrants in Norway as 
their numbers have grown. The fear of mass immigration culminated 
when Folkeakson Mot Innvandring FMI4n (peoples front against 
immigration) was established in 1984. The political impact of 
this party, however, is relatively small with its one member in 
the Norwegian parliament. Also, at the local elections in 1991, 
Norway had three minor parties with anti immigration as their 
primary goal.
As noted before (see chapter 1.2 page 8), Norway has 
experienced positive net immigration of approximately four 
thousand persons annually since the early 19 60s. Also most of the 
net migration is from relatively poor countries in Africa, 
Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe. In 1990, immigration from 
Europe constituted approximately 50 percent of the total 
immigration to Norway, whereas just four percent of the net 
immigration. Generally, the emigrants from Norway to Europe tend 
to be of the same age as the immigrants from Europe to Norway.41
At this point it is important to distinguish between the 
characteristics of an immigrant and a refugee. In statistical 
reports, refugees are considered immigrants to simplify matters. 
However, refugees are different from immigrants in several 
respects, and most importantly, refugees tend to be of all ages. 
Thus, an increase in the number of immigrants to Norway will 
influence neither the age structure nor fertility in Norway much 
if the larger part of the immigrants are refugees. Moreover, in
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years when the number of asylum seekers or refugees is high, the 
Norwegian government tend to further reduce the number of other 
immigrants in order to keep the total number of immigrants fairly 
stable. Therefore in years with where there are many asylum 
seekers and refugees, the Norwegian population will increase. 
However, a relatively large share of the immigrants will be 
infertile. In 1991 the total number of refugees was 1486, which 
icludes reunification cases and persons given a permit to stay 
for humanitarian reasons.42 The refugees tend to be from poor 
countries which have experienced recent wars, political or 
religious disorder, and famine among other factors. Typically, 
those countries are also the ones that make up approximately 90 
percent of the net immigration to Norway.
Table 9 presents the immigration to Norway after country of 
origin. In this table, 1991 is used as a reference year. The 
reason why I use 1991 as a reference year is that 19 91 was an 
average year, with no large cyclical fluctuation in immigration 
to or emigration from Norway. Also 1991 is a fairly recent year, 
which may give a good picture of what to expect in the near 
future. Even though data are available for 1992 and 1993, I chose 
not to use those data as reference, because of the unusual large 
impact the refugees from former Yugoslavia have on total 
immigration as well as net immigration to Norway.
As can be seen in table 9, most of the net immigration is 
from Asia. Viet Nam, Iran, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan are the 
countries that contributes most to positive net migration to
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Norway. I argued, and explained why these immigrants necessarily 
do not increase the total number of births in Norway 
significantly, since many of the immigrants from Asia are 
refugees.
Table 9. Immigration and emigration among foreign citizens by 
citizenship of the immigrants (in 1991).
Immigration Emigration Netmigration % share:
Country:
Europe total: 7396 7202 194
Denmark 1809 1982 - 173
Finland 187 366 - 179
Iceland 284 303 - 19
Sweden 1082 1123 - 41
Turkey 515 139 376
germany 321 224 97
United Kingdom 715 1433 - 718
USSR 200 11 189
Poland 459 238 221
Yugoslavia 826 468 358
France 180 325 - 145
Netherlands 181 228 - 47
Rest of Europe 637 362 275
Africa total: 1358 348 1010
Ethiopia 229 27 202
Gambia 48 17 31
Morocco 217 28 189
Nigeria 37 8 29
Rest of Africa 827 268 559
Asia total: 5013 814 4199
Philippines 400 48 352
India 239 82 157
Iran 733 106 627
China 325 47 278
Pakistan 578 163 415
Sri Lanka 587 115 472
Republic of Korea 129 20 109
Thailand 241 17 224
Viet Nam 1004 26 978
Rest of Asia 777 190 587
3.33
17.34 %
72.11
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N. America total: 1022 966 56 0.96 %
Canada 86 322 - 236
USA 857 612 245
Rest N. America 79 32 47
S. America total: 695 311 384 6.59 %
Brazil 84 44 40
Chile 262 216 46
Colombia 230 7 223
Rest S. America 119 44 75
Oceania total: 101 121 - 20 —
Australia 81 95 - 14
New Zealand 20 25 5
Rest of Oceania 0 1 1
Total: 15585 9762 5823 100.00 %
Source: Norweginan Bureau of Statistics.
Immigrants from Africa and Asia that are still in their 
fertile years, however, tend to give birth to more children than 
Norwegian born females. This is because they are accustomed to 
different fertility patterns in their respective home countries. 
0stby (1992) examined the fertility for immigrant women by length 
of stay in Norway and country of origin. Generally, he found that 
women from Pakistan, Turkey and Morocco have the highest total 
fertility rates, and that women from other industrial countries 
have the lowest total fertility rates.
This implies that immigrant women in their reproductive ages 
from developed countries have a much higher fertility than 
immigrants from developed countries. In 1987, Norwegian born 
women had a total fertility rate of 1.720, and women born abroad 
had a total fertility rate of 2.193. The total fertility rate for 
all women in Norway in 1987 was 1.745, which implies that foreign
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born women increased the total fertility rate in Norway by 0.025 
in 1987. For the years 1988-1991, foreign born women in Norway 
"caused" the total fertility rate to increase by approximately 
0.02.43 The total fertility rate among the immigrants from 
developed countries (excluding refugees) displays a strong 
association between fertility and duration of stay in Norway.
This implies that immigrants from the third world countries adapt 
to Norwegian fertility patterns relatively fast.
Table 10. Total fertility rate for immigrant women, by length of 
stay (in years) in Norway. (1991). (Oth=other).
Length of stay:
Country:
-2 I
CM 5-6 7-9 10-12 13+
Scandianavia: 1.4 2,1 2,2 2,2 1,8 1/7
Europe (minus Turkey): 2,4 2,2 1/9 1/6 1/4 1/5
Oth. industrialized countries: 1/9 2,0 1/9 1/5 1/8 2,0
Pakistan, Turkey, Morocco: 6,8 4,8 3,5 3,4 3,0 2,9
Oth. third world countries: 3,4 2,6 2,5 2,0 2,2 2,1
Source: Utenriksdepartementet, and 0stby (1992) •
Another important aspect to consider is repatriation. 
Repatriation is not a distinct part of Norwegian immigration 
policy, even though more recently an increasing share of 
immigrants have returned to their country of origin. Most of the 
return migrants are people from developed countries, whereas 
people from less developed countries tend to become permanent 
citizens of Norway.
6.2.1 EC Membership and Migration.
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The Norwegian government recently sent in an application to 
join the European Community (EC), and we will have a referendum 
in November of this year. As one can expect, small farmers and 
coastal fishermen generally oppose membership (because of 
potentially worsened economic conditions), whereas capitalists 
and large corporations tend to advocate a possible EC 
membersship. Most EC and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
countries have an interest in evaluating the possible effect of 
the Single Market for immigration within the member countries. In 
Scandinavia, we have had a free Nordic labor market since 1954. 
The total effect of this agreement on migration between the 
Scandinavian countries is not clear. What is clear, however, is 
that labor force conditions are important for the migratory 
pattern. There have been short term streams between the 
Scandianian countries when one or more of the countries 
experience abnormal fluctuations in the unemployment level. Also, 
when the general level of wages is higher in one or more of the 
Scandinavian countries, people from the other countries tend to 
migrate.
Membership in the EC can be expected to have approximately 
the same influence on the Norwegian migratory pattern as the free 
Nordic labor market. The free movement of people between the 
European countries will be dependent on work prospects and the 
general wage level, as well as the distance between countries.
The regional distribution of people in Norway, on the other hand, 
can be expected to change dramatically. The common agricultural
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policy in the EC will harm the Norwegian farmers, since they will 
have trouble with staying competitive. Internal migration to more 
urban areas in Norway (the southeast coast, and the westcoast) 
must be expected.
At this point, it is also uncertain how intergrated the EC 
will become in the future. If both goods and capital markets 
become completely integrated, international trade issues become 
regional in nature. The main difference between regional trade 
issues and international trade issues is in the mobility of 
factors of production. Factors of production are highly mobile 
between regions, but less mobile between nations. This causes 
regions to compete for the mobile factors of production (people
i
included). Therefore, in the long run trade will be based on 
absolute advantage rather than comparative advantage. In the 
extreme case, people and other factors of production would move 
to the regions that pay the most (or the ones with the highest 
productivity), and less productive regions would just disappear.
A general perception among economists as well as demographers is 
that the most productive areas tend to cluster around urban 
centers. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that an extremely 
integrated EC would further reinforce the urbanization process.
The potential urbanization process that may take place in 
Norway due to an EC membership is undoubtedly one of the 
strongest arguments against EC membership for Norway. Recent 
surveys show that approximately 54 percent of the Norwegian 
population opposes EC membership.44 When it comes to population
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policy, regional aspects have an important position in Norway. 
This is because of geographic location, and the mere shape of the 
country. Norway is extremely elongated, approximately eighteen 
hundred miles in lenght and just three hundred miles at its 
widest points, averaging just ninety miles. Therefore, in Norway 
it is important to maintain strategic rural population districts 
in order to be able to support all sorts of infrastructure 
between the various regions of the country. Without hesitation, 
it is reasonable to claim that people as well as policy makers in 
Norway today are more concerned with regional population issues 
than with the prospect of a depopulation in the future.
6.3 Empirical Results in Retrospect.
The empirical section (see chapter 4) examines several 
variables expected to influence fertility. Of those variables, 
only child benefits can be looked upon as a direct instrument 
used for pronatalist purposes. Therefore, child benefits will be 
addressed in a separate chapter (see chapter 6.3.1). However, in 
its broadest sense, all policy that influences fertility can be 
considered pronatalist. The total number of seats available in 
kindergartens can be viewed as a pronatalistic instrument, and 
also as an instrument used to create job opportunities. The 
primary purpose of Unemployment benefits is to level out 
differences in disposable income in the same way as progressive 
taxes. The potential effect unemployment benefits can have on
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fertility is of a secondary nature, and not considered when 
policy makers develope the structure and provision of 
unemployment benefits. Therefore, unemployment benefits must be 
viewed as an indirect pronatalist instrument. The other 
variables, female and male wages, and female education all have 
influence on fertility, but in a strict sense they are not 
pronatalist variables.
The empirical results in chapter 5.3 provide some 
information on how to increase fertility in Norway. It seems that 
an increase in male wages, child benefits, unemployment benefits, 
and seats available in kindergartens will increase the total 
fertility rate, whereas an increase in female wages and the 
number of female students will decrease fertility.
To decrease the number of female students and female wages 
in order to achieve increased fertility is an unacceptable policy 
in developed countries today. Equality among the sexes is among 
the main goals of most developed countries, and a reversal of 
this process is neither possible nor desirable. Assuming like 
Butz and Ward that male and female time inputs are gross 
substitutes, an increase in male wages relative to female wages 
might induce females to leave the labor market and perhaps have 
children instead. However, this type of policy is also 
unacceptable by the same reasoning as above. Therefore instead of 
an increase in the male to female wage ratio, it is reasonable to 
assume that the male to female wage ratio will decrease. This 
again will increase the opportunity cost of time for females, and
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thus reduce fertility. It may seem that because women's 
liberation is social liberation, we will have to accept the 
unevitable side effect of reduced fertility. In order to 
compensate for this reduction in fertility, other policy 
instruments must be considered.
The first best policy would be to decrease the opportunity 
cost of time for females without having to distort labor market 
conditions. Since real income determines the ppportunity cost of 
time, higher tax rates would influence the opportunity cost but 
also the labor force participation among both sexes. In some
hand, tax rates are among the highest (if not the highest) in the 
world, and would therefore be difficult to increase much more.
Social changes that give incentives to females to have 
children while staying employed have been fruitful approaches in 
Norway. Among other things, paid maternity leave, parents' right 
to part-time work, child benefits, and public! daycare have been 
policies utilized to increase fertility. Paid maternity leave and 
parents right to part-time work deserve special attention, 
because of the unique position maternity leavk and part-time work 
have in Norway. When a woman gives birth to a child in Norway, 
she has the right to a 52 week full paid maternity leave 
immediately after the birth. Few countries in the world have 
maternity leaves of this length and the same level of economic 
compensation. The only other developed countries with equivalent 
arrangements are Sweden and Denmark. In Sweden, the wage
countries on the other
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compensation is 90 percent, but the maternity leave is eight 
weeks longer. In both Norway and Sweden the maternity leave can 
be extended for a period of time, but the compensation is 
decreased. Also, the father of a child can take a maternity leave 
of 90 days. Generally, the wage compensation for fathers is lower 
than that for mothers.45Part time work during pregnancy and 
after childbirth is also common among women in Norway. The reason 
why the Norwegian government facilitates labor force 
participation among pregnant women and mothers is twofold. First, 
it gives potential mothers the opportunity to have a child 
without having to quit working. Second, being out of job for a 
period of time may lead to possible long term costs to the 
woman's career. Therefore, the Norwegian government emphasizes 
both social and pronatalist aspects in its facilitation of part 
time work.
An increase in the availability of kindergarten seats and 
increased child benefits incurs cost to the society. In terms of 
increased child benefits, an important question needs to be 
answered. What is the monetary value of a child to society? Put 
in another way, the marginal cost to society of a marginal 
increase in the number of children should be equal to the 
marginal benefit of a marginal increase in the number of 
children. Unarguably it is almost impossible to ascertain the 
monetary value of a child to society. Therefore, child benefits 
can be argued either to be too high or too low dependent upon 
subjective opinions about the value of a child. Since child
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benefit payments have increased dramatically in Norway over the 
last 30 years, it is reasonable to assume that the value of a 
child to society has increased. It should also be emphasized, 
however, that the cost of childrearing has increased almost by 
the same amount in this period. An increase in the number of 
kindergarten seats is positively related to fertility. This 
increase will incur costs as in the case of child benefits. 
However, an increase in the number of kindergaren seats will 
create job opportunities as well. This positive side effect 
implies that one instrument (an increase in the number of 
kindergarten seats) can satisfy two objectives: increased 
fertility as well as the creation of job opportunities. I 
personally believe that instruments with this property should be 
pursued by developed countries that want to increase fertility.
In France, perhaps the developed country that emphasizes 
pronatalist policy the most, increases in the capacity in 
kindergartens have been the chief instrument along with dramatic 
changes in the tax system.
The effects of a pronatalistic policy depend on what type of 
policy instrument is being used, as well as the intensity of the 
policy (e.g., how much money is being spent on child care 
services). Today, there is limited research available about the 
efficiency of different pronatalistic policies. Consequently, a 
comparison of different pronatalistic policy instruments, and a 
critical evaluation of the different policies is difficult.
With the dark picture painted by Brunborg and others in
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mind, one can question how expensive progressive or pronatalistic 
policies can be justified. I am not proposing that pronatalistic 
policies should be abandoned but rather that policy makers should 
be aware of the possible inefficiency in these types of policies. 
Perhaps inexpensive, indirect pronatalist policies instead should 
be pursued by policy makers.
6.3.1 Child Benefits as Pronatalistic Policy in Norway.
A real pronatalistic policy should be arranged in a way that 
gives women economic incentives to have more children. This will 
be the case if, and only if, child benefits increase 
progressively with the number of children (and desired family 
size is less than current family size).
When child benefits were introduced in Norway in 1946, they 
were arranged as a constant increasing function of the number of 
children. At that time the number of births had increased for 
several years and more social than pronatalistic considerations 
were taken into consideration.
In 19 63, the Norwegian government made child benefits 
progressive. Nevertheless, it seems unreasonable to assume that 
progressive child benefits were introduced for pronatalistic 
reasons since Norway at that time experienced its highest total 
fertility rate in 40 years.
As I explained above, child benefits have become 
increasingly less progressive over the period 1967-1991, and this
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is still an ongoing trend. What are the reasons for this? Two 
answers seem possible:
-The Norwegian government has no pronatalistic attitude.
-Child benefits are not viewed as a pronatalist instrument but 
rather as a social instrument used to level out differences in 
economic status.
6.4 Some Remarks About Future Population Features in Norway.
This section presents a brief discussion of what to expect 
in the future as far as fertility, the size of the population and 
age structure are concerned. First, however, I would like to 
present the baby boom and baby bust period in total number of 
births. The total number of births in a period will cause 
generation waves approximately 25 to 35 years later according to 
Sundt. Sometimes in demography this effect is referred to as the 
echo effect, or population momentum. Figure 10 presents the total 
number of births in Norway during the period 1962-1991. The total 
number of births was fairly stable, around 55 to 60 thousand in 
the 1950s.
As one can see, the total number of births in Norway 
displayed large variations over the period 1962-1991. The 1960s 
was dominated by a large number of births every year, and is 
considered the baby boom era. The peak of the baby boom occured
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in 19 69, never before had the total number of births exceeded 70 
thousand in Norway. During the next eight years, Norway 
experienced its sharpest continuous decline in the number of 
births in recent history. The total number of births decreased 
from 70201 in 1969 to to 50708 in 1977, which implies a 27 
percent decrease in the number of births in just eight years.
Figure 10. Number of births,
-In Norway for the period 1962-1991.
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From 1977, the total number of births remained stable at around 
50 thousand until 1984, which is considered the end of the baby 
bust period in Norway. After 1984, Norway experienced an increase 
in fertility much do to increased fertility among women above 
thirty years of age (see table ll).46 The echo effect from the
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19 60s when the number of births were high also serve as a partial 
explanation why the number of births have increased in the late 
1980s.
s 11. Age- specific fertility rates. 1984-1992.
Year: 25-29
Age of women. 
30-34 35-39
1984 123,7 68,20 22,20
1985 125,5 70,90 22,70
1986 129,4 74,40 22,20
1987 131,7 79,70 24,60
1988 138,6 85,10 27,70
1989 140,6 91,30 29,70
1990 144,0 95,20 32,30
1991 145,1 97,30 35,10
1992 144,8 99,60 38,80
Source: Official Statistics Norway.
Assuming an echo effect of 25 to 35 years, Norway can expect 
an increase in the total number of births in the period 1990 to 
2005. However, if the period total fertility rate remains low, 
the new boom in the 19 90s will have less impact than the boom in 
the 1960s.
Since the total fertility rate is far below replacement 
level, which is 2,08 in Norway, the Norwegian population will 
start to decline sometime in the future. As argued in chapter
6.2.2 the present net migration level to Norway is neither 
sufficient to prevent a population decline nor to increase the 
total fertility rate above replacement level. In Christiansen 
(1992) I did several projections of the future population in 
Norway based on the so called component method.
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The results of the different model specifications are 
presented in table 11. From table 11, one can realize the 
enormous impact different fertility levels have on the future 
population. If the total fertility rate had dropped to 1.38 
(model 1) in 1990, Norway would have experienced a population 
decline in the 1990s. In the most likely case in which the total 
fertility rate is 1.72 (model 2), the Norwegian population will 
increase and reach a maximum of 4.35 million people in 2010. The 
reason why the Norwegian population will increase even though the 
total fertility rate is below the replacement level is because of 
the large cohorts of women in their reproductive ages, and small 
cohorts of elderly people. In the final model (model 3), the 
total fertility rate is pegged at the replacement level for the 
whole period. In this model the population will increase and 
almost reach the 5 million mark in 2040.
The results presented in table 11 are sensitive to changes 
in demographic components, and must be considered mere 
supposition rather than solid research. Also, the time horizon is 
rather long, which implies that the extrapolated values of the 
population size are uncertain.
If the death and fertility rates are constant over time in a 
closed economy (no migration), a constant age structure is 
achieved and the population grows or declines at a constant rate 
(stable population). This is advantageous for age specific 
allocation of resources. If the number of people within the 
different age groups remain constant over time, the allocation of
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resources can stay the same provided the relative affluence of 
the different age groups is to remain constant.
Table 12. Projection of future population in Norway.*
Year:
Model
(1.38)
Total fertility 
1 Model 2 
(1.72)
rate. 
Model 3 
(2.08)
1990 4.24 4.24 4.24
2000 4.23 4.33 4.46
2010 4.15 4.35 4.59
2020 3.98 4.32 4.77
2040 3.46 4.08 4.98
*A11 numbers are in millions.
The age structure in the future in Norway has been examined 
thoroughly by Brunborg (1985). He argues that (based on different 
assumptions on the components of the basic demographic equation) 
there will be a large scale aging of the population. Based on 
constant mortality rates and yearly immigration of 4000 as well 
as a total fertility rate of 1.72, Brunborg found that the share 
of people aged 66 or older would increase from 13 percent in 1985 
to 16.4 percent in 2020, and that there would be large increases 
among the super elderly (80+). At the same time, the share of 
people under 16 years of age would decrease from 23.2 percent in 
1985 to 17.3 percent in 2020. However, it seems that the the 
number of people that need economic support will remain fairly 
stable in the future (when the share of people aged 66 or more 
increases, the share of people aged 16 or less decreases).
6.5 Population Policy Since the Mid 1980s.
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An interesting article by Hoem (1990) examines the increase 
in total fertility rate experienced in Sweden since approximately 
1985. Hoem argues persistently that the increase in total 
fertility rate is due to changes in Swedish social or population 
policy that intentionally or otherwise provides a financial 
incentive to closer spacing of births. What is even more 
interesting is the way he compares the fertility increase shared 
by the Scandinavian countries Sweden, Norway, and Denmark since 
the mid-1980s. Most other European countries have not experienced 
this same upward trend in fertility during this period. Hoem 
argues:
I know of no other country with a similar political 
system and at a comparable stage of industrial 
development that has so consequently tried to facilitate 
women's entry into the labor market and their attachment 
to it at minimal cost to childbearing and childrearing. 
Ideally, the record high and continuously growing labor 
force participation of Swedish women, combined with 
comparatively high and generally increasing fertility 
should be a reward for such efforts, (see page 740).
Hoem then explains that Norway, and to some degree Denmark, 
closely trail Sweden because of similar efforts in the respective
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countries. I cannot tell if this in fact is a reasonable 
explanation, but if it is, pronatalistic policies may have a 
future after all. One problem, however, in Hoem's article is that 
the time span is less than ten years, which I feel is a rather 
short time to base conclusions on.
7.0 CONCLUSION.
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The discussion of the economometric work gave useful answers 
to several important questions in economic fertility theories.
Two well known theories have been tested using Norwegian time 
series data (the Easterlin hypothesis, and the New Home Economics 
approach). Some other variables that are expected to influence 
fertility have also been included. The Easterlin hypothesis in 
its simplest form was not supported in Norway for the period 
1962-1991, even though I suggested that high values for the 
relative cohort size seem to explain fertility trends better than 
low values. Also a Granger test of causality provided evidence 
against the Easterlin hypothesis. All discussion of the Easterlin 
hypothesis is based on Easterlin's assumption that relative 
cohort size is a good instrumental variable for relative economic 
status. Therefore, even though I found evidence against the 
relative cohort size and its impact on past fertility trend in 
Norway, I am not able to completely reject the Easterlin 
hypothesis (that is if the relative cohort size is a bad 
instrumental variable for the relative income hypothesis).
The New Home Economics approach with its emphasis on male 
income and female wages is supported in Norway. Male income is, 
as expected, positively related to the fertility rate, and female 
wage is negatively related to the fertility rate. The other 
variables in this model proved less significant, but the model 
provides support for a negative relation between female education
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and the fertility rate. Most of the models are tested with both 
one and two years effective lags, and the models with two years 
effective lag generally are the best ones. The two year lag 
models are the ones that take the waiting time to conception, as 
described by Bongaarts, into consideration.
As always, however, several important issues have been 
neglected because of data collecting problems, and because of 
lack of knowledge. A more delicate discussion of the Easterlin 
hypothesis with the Oppenheimer approach as a central theme could 
perhaps provide some important insight into the Easterlin 
hypothesis. An extension of the Granger test that includes not 
only the direction of causality, but also the signs of the 
coefficients would also be useful. As for the New Home Economics 
model, much could have been done to make the analysis more 
realistic. Among other things, a single equation model with six 
independent variables is not able to explain the
interdependencies that may exist among the independent variables. 
For example, it is reasonable to assume that female wage is 
positively related to female education. Also, a more complex 
child benefit approach that includes child benefits that are 
nonlinear functions of birth order would be interesting to 
consider in future research. A pooled New Home Economics model 
using time series data and cross sectional data for the 
Scandinavian countries, for example, may provide some additional 
insight. This procedure will result in more observations and thus 
more efficient parameter estimates.
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From the discussion provided in this paper it seems obvious 
that the New Home Economics approach fits the post World War II 
experience in Norway better than the Easterlin hypothesis. In 
particular, the Butz and Ward approach seems to fit Norwegian 
material particularly well. In simplicity the Butz and Ward 
approach is based on a complex relation between male and female 
wages. They argue that the baby boom was primarily due to rising 
male income, and that the baby bust was due to rising female 
wages. This seems to be a likely explanation for the post World 
War II fertility experience in other European countries as well. 
Most of the European countries have experienced rising male 
income and rising female wages. The male-female wage ratio has 
declined, and female labor force participation has increased. 
These are all factors that support the Butz and Ward approach. I, 
therefore, believe that future research aimed at testing New Home 
Economics models in most European countries would be fruitful. 
Finally, it would be interesting to see the New Home Economics 
model applied to undeveloped and developing countries. My guess 
is that the New Home Economics model would be inappropriate in 
such countries because of low female labor force participation 
and large male to female wage ratios.
7.1 What Can be Expected from Migration Policy?
Based on the discussion, the effect of a migration policy in 
Norway is at least uncertain. It is obvious that positive net
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migration will increase the population, but the current net 
migration level of approximately four thousand people annually is 
not sufficient to prevent a decrease in the Norwegian population 
in the long run (see the discussion in chapter 6.4). A more 
selective migration policy, biased toward young immigrants from 
third world countries, could change this picture, but such a 
policy can be hard to enforce when immigrants from third world 
countries already contribute about 90 percent of the total net 
migration. Lifting the immigration ban is a possible, but not a 
realistic, option in Norway today. However, adopting some form of 
immigration quotas may be an alternative that would be acceptable 
to most of the political parties. A possible EC membership will 
not change population features in Norway much more than what the 
free Nordic labor market has accomplished. When Norway 
experiences good times, the net labor migration from the other 
Nordic countries tends to increase and vice versa. In the extreme 
case, when the EC is completely integrated (in which each country 
is like a state in a larger country, as in the U.S.) absolute 
advantage in production may cause large rural areas in Norway to 
be completely depopulated. To sum up briefly, instituational 
arrangements, immigration ban, and the large share of refugees 
among the immigrants in Norway makes migration policy somewhat 
sterile in influencing the inevitable depopulation of Norway in 
the future (with current levels of the total fertility rate). In 
any circumstances, it is unrealistic to expect that fertility 
among immigrants alone can raise the total fertility rate above
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replacement level.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix I provide the results obtained from the 
three year lag model of the Easterlin hypothesis, as well as a 
semi log model of the New Home Economics model. The implication 
of these results are not discussed, so the models are just 
included for interested readers.
Model (1) lnTFRt = a1 + a2lnRCSt_3+et t=1962, ... # 1991.
Table 1. The statistical significance of the
relative cohort size using a log linear model 
(model 1) lagged three years.*
Three year lag
Variable
Relative cohort size 1.870
(4.747)
Intercept -0.406
(-2.051)
Adj R-sq: 0.4465
26
0.186
Number obs: 
DW-statistic 
DW-critical: 1.30-1.46
XA11 t-statistics are given in parentheses.
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Model (2) blnTFRt. = p1 + p2dlnRCSt_3 +et t=1 9 6 2 1 9 9 1 .
where SlnTFRt = lnTFRt-lnTFR^ A blnRCSt = lnRCSt-lnRCS^
Table 2. The statistical significance of the relative cohort 
size using a first differenced log linear model 
lagged three years (model 2)*
Variable:
Three year lag.
Relative cohort size: 0.156
(0.613)
Intercept: -0.014
(-2.167)
Adj R-sq: -0.0256
Number obs: 25
DW-statistic:
'tf-w-. . 'r'y • ■ ■
0.840
*A11 t-statistics are given in parentheses.
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M o d e l (3) I n t f r h i = y 1 + y 21 nRCSHI_3 + eHI
In T F R jjj Cl + + ®LO
Table 6. The significance of the relative cohort size using 
log linear models, when relative cohort size is 
divided in high and low observations (model 3).*
Variable:
Three year lag
Low levels:
Relative cohort size: -0.138
(-0.076)
Intercept: 0.732
(0.769)
Adj R-sq: -0.090
Number obs: 12
High levels:
Relative cohort size: 2.757
(8.110)
Intercept: -0.944
(-4.433)
Adj R-sq: 0.8437
Number obs:
^  ___
12
*A11 t-statistics are given in parenthesis.
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Model (4) lnTFRt = b1 + 62Xlt.D + Z3X2t_n + 64X3t_n + + 66X5t_n + b7X6t_a*et
Where n=1,2. t=1962,...,1991.
Table 8. Semi log model on: Male and female wages, child 
benefits, seats in kindergarten, unemployment 
benefits, females in higher education. TFR is 
still the dependent variable (model 4).*
Number of lags.
1 Year. 2 Year.
Variable:
Xl=Male wage:
X2=Female wage
X3=Female edu:
X4=Child benefit:
X5=Kindergarten:
X6=Unempl. benef
Intercept:
14.19977
(1.761)
-21.91278
(-2.311)
-0.008055
(-1.329)
0.000033
(2.750)
-0.000059
(-0.050)
0.002644
(1.184)
1.225174
(3.405)
24.89061
(3.139)
-31.10592
(-3.312)
-0.005526
(-0.823)
-0.00005
(-0.039)
0.000390
(-0.356)
0.006325
(3.103)
0.348547
(1.006)
Number of obs: 29 28
Adj R-sq: 0.8146 0.8154
DW-statistic: 0.677 0.853
*A11 t-values are presented in parentheses.
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